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This Article argues that the judicial prohibition on neighborhood zoning districts
is inconsistent with the judiciary’s permissive attitude toward BIDs and special
assessment districts. As I demonstrate, the neighborhood zoning district is conceptually identical to the special assessment district/BID. Both devices are designed to
enable large, diverse cities to capture some of the governance advantages of small,
homogeneous suburbs by providing landowners with the direct ability to manage
local externalities. This Article attempts to make sense of the disparate treatment
accorded these devices by examining several grounds upon which they could
potentially be, and have been, distinguished. I find, however, that the only meaningful distinction between these mechanisms is that special assessment districts/BIDs
actually raise far more troubling public policy concerns than neighborhood zoning
districts, thus calling into question why the judiciary has been so much more
deferential toward the former than the latter. I conclude that courts should broadly
defer to municipal delegations of power to sub-local groups, so that cities can work
out their own strategies for surviving in an era of intense interlocal competition.
INTRODUCTION .............................................................................. 941
I. MANAGING LOCAL EXTERNALITIES BY DEVOLVING
POWER TO LANDOWNERS ........................................................ 947
A. Neighbors and Externalities ......................................................... 947
B. The Neighborhood Zoning District ................................................. 951
C. The Special Assessment District .................................................... 952
D. Capitalization, Coercion, and the Public Choice
Regulatory Model ....................................................................... 954
II. PUBLIC CHOICE AND THE JURISPRUDENCE OF
NEIGHBORHOOD EMPOWERMENT ........................................... 957
A. Neighborhood Zoning and Standardless Delegation: Revisiting the
Eubank-Cusack-Roberge Riddle ................................................ 957
B. Special Assessments, BIDs, and the “One Person, One Vote” Rule ...... 962
C. Unifying the Doctrine? ................................................................ 967
III. PUBLIC POLICY AND NEIGHBORHOOD EMPOWERMENT .......... 969
A. The Risk of Majoritarian Exploitation ........................................... 969
1. The Federalist No. 10 and Neighborhood Homogeneity ........ 970
a. The Neighborhood Zoning District..................................... 971
b. The Special Assessment District ....................................... 972
i. Conflict Among Landowners in the BID ............... 973
ii. Conflict Between Landowners and Tenants
in the BID ............................................................ 974
iii. Conflict Between Landowners and Users
in the BID ............................................................ 975

2013]

Neighborhood Empowerment

941

iv. Other Special Assessment Districts ....................... 976
v. Comparing the Neighborhood Zoning District
and the Special Assessment District....................... 977
2. Preventing Majoritarian Exploitation
Through Logrolling ........................................................... 978
a. The Neighborhood Zoning District.................................... 980
b. The Special Assessment District ....................................... 984
B. “Regulation” or “Supplemental Services”?....................................... 987
1. Landowner Challenges ....................................................... 989
2. Nonlandowner Challenges ................................................. 993
C. Spillovers and Comprehensive Planning ......................................... 994
1. The Neighborhood Zoning District .................................... 997
2. The Special Assessment District ....................................... 1001
CONCLUSION: THE NEIGHBORHOOD AND THE SUBURB ............... 1003

INTRODUCTION
Some species evade predators by mimicking other creatures, but only
one survives by imitating its own predator: the city. It is by now a familiar
story that many jobs and people have fled the cities and flocked to the
suburbs over the past half-century.1 Suburbs have been more attractive than
central cities as sites for settlement and investment, at least in part because
their relatively smaller and more homogeneous populations have enabled
suburbs to ensure that landowners’ tax expenditures are concentrated on
their own needs, rather than subjected to the redistributive claims of a
variety of citywide interest groups.2 Suburbs also enjoy wide latitude to use
1 The population of suburban communities more than doubled between 1950 and 1970, comprising 83% of the nation’s total growth during that period, while American cities suffered a net
loss of population from 1950 to 1980. KENNETH T. JACKSON, CRABGRASS FRONTIER: THE
SUBURBANIZATION OF THE UNITED STATES 283 (1985). By 1970, more Americans dwelled in
suburbs than in cities and rural areas combined, and by 1980 the suburban population in virtually
every major metropolitan area outnumbered that of the central city. Id. Although cities have
experienced a well-documented resurgence in recent years, the majority of Americans continue to
reside in relatively small suburban communities. See WILLIAM A. FISCHEL, THE HOMEVOTER
HYPOTHESIS 15 (2001).
2 See, e.g., Richard Briffault, The Rise of Sublocal Structures in Urban Governance, 82 MINN. L.
REV. 503, 506 (1997) (observing that cities’ greater diversity vis-à-vis suburbs is likely to cause a
“greater heterogeneity of preferences” and thus a higher degree of dissatisfaction among city
residents); Sheryll D. Cashin, Localism, Self-Interest, and the Tyranny of the Favored Quarter:
Addressing the Barriers to New Regionalism, 88 GEO. L.J. 1985, 2018 (2000) (arguing that the
“smallness and homogeneity” of suburban communities enable them “to wield local powers to
exclude undesirables and pursue the locality’s collective self-interest”); Robert C. Ellickson, New
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the zoning power to protect their tax bases and landowners’ property values
by excluding undesirable uses without interference from other stakeholders,
like real estate developers, who may have divergent demands.3
In recent decades, however, cities have experienced something of a
renaissance, which many attribute to city officials’ realization that in order
to entice and retain investment in the face of suburban competition, cities
must somehow provide the benefits that small size and homogeneity afford
the suburbs.4 Thus, for example, many cities enable neighborhood groups to

Institutions for Old Neighborhoods, 48 DUKE L.J. 75, 89 (1998) (noting that with increasing size,
cities are less able to limit and hence more susceptible to influence “by rent-seeking groups such as
political machines, municipal unions, public works lobbies, and downtown business interests”).
3 See, e.g., FISCHEL, supra note 1, at 15-16 (arguing that homeowners are the dominant faction in small, suburban communities and that they use zoning controls to protect their own wealth
while developers are largely “supplicants”); Richard Briffault, Our Localism: Part II—Localism and
Legal Theory, 90 COLUM. L. REV. 346, 372-74 (1990) (explaining that neighborhood groups in
cities cannot effectively control their own zoning because they must compete for power with other
interests within the same polity, whereas suburbs, which are frequently just incorporated
neighborhoods, can control their own zoning without interference from competing groups).
4 See, e.g., Richard Schragger, Does Governance Matter? The Case of Business Improvement Districts and the Urban Resurgence, 3 DREXEL L. REV. 49, 58-61 (2010) (surveying and critiquing
literature attributing urban resurgence to efforts by city officials to entice mobile sources of
revenue from other cities and suburbs). The widespread assumption that cities and suburbs are
locked in a zero-sum competition for mobile sources of revenue stems from the predominant
“Tiebout model” of local government. For the origins of this model, see Charles M. Tiebout, A
Pure Theory of Local Expenditures, 64 J. POL. ECON. 416, 418 (1956). According to the model,
individuals in a metropolitan region with a variety of municipal jurisdictions are properly
conceived as “consumer-voters” who essentially shop for a municipality that provides them with
their preferred package of municipal services. Id.; see also Vicki Been, “Exit” as a Constraint on Land
Use Exactions: Rethinking the Unconstitutional Conditions Doctrine, 91 COLUM. L. REV. 473, 507-08
(1991) (explaining that not only do consumers “‘shop’ for a particular level and combination of
public goods,” but municipalities may also “compete for residents by trying to offer a desirable
package of services at the lowest cost” (footnote omitted)); Briffault, supra note 3, at 400 (“The
multiplicity of localities assures a range of choices and increases the likelihood that one locality
will approximate the mobile consumer-voter’s preferences.”). Under this model, local governments, and especially central cities, can entice consumer-voters to live in their own communities
only by offering superior (or cheaper) amenities and services to neighboring communities. See
Edward L. Glaeser, The Death and Life of Cities (describing the rise and decline of cities as a
function of both private activity and government efforts to offer amenities to citizens and progrowth regulatory environments to businesses), in MAKING CITIES WORK: PROSPECTS AND
POLICIES FOR URBAN AMERICA 22, 25-30 (Robert P. Inman ed., 2009). This model has been
criticized but is still highly influential. See Schragger, supra, at 66 (arguing that “the basic idea of
‘competition’ between cities is incoherent” because sound local governance rarely creates growth;
rather, prosperity “is often a function of luck, path dependency, or the effects of very small
changes in a spatial equilibrium”); Richard C. Schragger, Rethinking the Theory and Practice of Local
Economic Development, 77 U. CHI. L. REV. 311, 315-20 (2010) (criticizing the Tiebout public choice
theory for adopting an overly simplistic notion of how cities develop, particularly through the
assumption that local policies affect economic development instead of acknowledging the role
organic growth plays in development).
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self-finance improvements and services for their areas through a “special
assessment”5 or the related “business improvement district” (BID).6 These
mechanisms typically work by enabling a percentage of landowners within a
territorially bounded district to petition the city for the imposition of a
mandatory charge upon all property in the district in order to fund desired
amenities for the area.7 Likewise, some municipalities have attempted to
give neighborhoods the authority to directly exclude undesirable land uses,
such as by enfranchising landowners within a geographically defined area to
vote on the applicability of specific zoning restrictions within that area.8 For
ease of reference, I call this device a “neighborhood zoning district.” The
special assessment district and the neighborhood zoning district are both,
fundamentally, efforts to import into the city the most attractive features of
suburban governance by devolving power to the smaller scale of the neighborhood, homogenizing the voting public through the restriction of the franchise to landowners, and insulating the group’s power from the politicking
and vote-trading prevalent at the citywide level.9
Herein, however, lies the problem that this Article seeks to resolve:
although neighborhood zoning districts and special assessment districts are
functionally similar mechanisms through which cities can compete with
suburbs, courts and scholars treat them as entirely distinct. While courts
have routinely upheld the special assessment and the BID against constitutional challenges, the majority of courts have also held that the neighborhood zoning district is an unconstitutional delegation of municipal land use
5 See generally ROBERT C. E LLICKSON & VICKI L. BEEN, LAND USE CONTROLS 619-34
(3d ed. 2005) (introducing the concepts of special assessments and BIDs and discussing the ways
in which courts have approached them); Laurie Reynolds, Taxes, Fees, Assessments, Dues, and the
“Get What You Pay For” Model of Local Government, 56 FLA. L. REV. 373, 397-402 (2004)
(describing the evolution of special assessments from a mechanism for financing finite capital
improvement projects into a general revenue raising tool).
6 See generally Richard Briffault, A Government for Our Time? Business Improvement Districts
and Urban Governance, 99 COLUM. L. REV. 365, 381-87 (1999) (describing the process of BID
formation); Symposium, Business Improvement Districts and the Evolution of Urban Governance, 3
DREXEL L. REV. 1 (2010) (exploring various legal issues related to BIDs).
7 See infra Section I.C.
8 See, e.g., Washington ex rel. Seattle Title Trust Co. v. Roberge, 278 U.S. 116, 118 (1928)
(describing a local ordinance requiring the consent of two-thirds of property owners located
within 400 feet of any proposed group home); Thomas Cusack Co. v. City of Chicago, 242 U.S.
526, 527-28 (1917) (evaluating a law requiring the consent of landowners owning the majority of
property on a block before a billboard company could put up a billboard on that block); Eubank v.
City of Richmond, 226 U.S. 137, 141 (1912) (describing an ordinance delegating power to blockfront landowners to establish uniform setback lines). See also generally JEFFREY M. BERRY ET
AL., THE REBIRTH OF URBAN DEMOCRACY 141 (1993) (describing efforts by five cities to
devolve land use powers to neighborhood groups).
9 See infra Section I.D.
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power.10 The courts make no effort to reconcile the two lines of precedent,
and indeed seem unaware that there may even be a relationship between
them.11 Scholars, too, have endorsed the special assessment and BID while
balking at the idea of conferring zoning powers on neighborhood groups,
without acknowledging the deep continuities between these two devices.12
Major consequences for urban policy have ensued. On the one hand,
neighborhood groups’ inability to exercise more influence over land use
decisions has caused significant disenchantment with city government, in
some cases even sparking campaigns for secession from the city.13 On the
other hand, spurred by courts’ permissive attitude, cities have increasingly
resorted to BIDs as a default option to deal with virtually any urban

10
11

See infra Sections II.A. & II.B.
See, e.g., Kessler v. Grand Cent. Dist. Mgmt. Ass’n, 158 F.3d 92, 108 (2d Cir. 1998)
(affirming the constitutionality of a BID voting structure without considering neighborhood
zoning cases); Cary v. City of Rapid City, 559 N.W.2d 891, 895-96 (S.D. 1997) (invalidating a
neighborhood zoning ordinance without considering special assessment cases). I discuss the
relationship between the two lines of doctrine in more detail infra Section II.C.
12 See Ellickson, supra note 2, at 98-99 (endorsing a neighborhood association that would
provide services financed by mandatory assessment but expressing skepticism about delegating
zoning power); George W. Liebmann, Devolution of Power to Community and Block Associations, 25
URB. LAW. 335, 346 (1993) (same). For a more detailed discussion of Ellickson and Liebmann’s
articles, see infra text accompanying notes 132-37 & 266-68. Robert Nelson, the rare scholar who
has actually advocated for neighborhood zoning control, neither discusses any of the applicable
precedent holding that the delegation of zoning authority to neighborhood groups is unconstitutional, nor directly compares neighborhood zoning districts with special assessment districts, as
this Article does. See ROBERT H. NELSON, PRIVATE NEIGHBORHOODS AND THE TRANSFORMATION OF LOCAL G OVERNMENT 403-08 (2005) (discussing several lines of potentially
applicable precedent but ignoring the delegation cases); infra note 138 and accompanying text.
13 In New York, residents of the borough of Staten Island initiated a drive to secede from
New York City after the United States Supreme Court held that the city’s “one borough, one
vote” method for electing members of its zoning and budget authority violated the constitutionally
mandated “one person, one vote” formula and ordered the city to reconstitute the authority,
thereby diluting Staten Island’s voice in land use matters. Richard Briffault, Voting Rights, Home
Rule, and Metropolitan Governance: The Secession of Staten Island as a Case Study in the Dilemmas of
Local Self-Determination, 92 COLUM. L. REV. 775, 783-85 (1992). Across the continent in Los
Angeles, homeowners in the vast adherent suburb of the San Fernando Valley have frequently
sought to secede from the city, citing concerns about taxes, school busing, and a desire to exercise
tighter control over their own land use. RAPHAEL J. SONENSHEIN, THE CITY AT STAKE:
SECESSION, REFORM, AND THE BATTLE FOR LOS ANGELES 72-83 (2004); see also M. Purcell,
Metropolitan Political Reorganization as a Politics of Urban Growth: The Case of San Fernando Valley
Secession, 20 POL. GEOGRAPHY 613, 617-26 (2001). The secession campaigns in both New York
and Los Angeles have failed, usually despite significant support within the aggrieved areas,
because state law in New York and California, as in most states, requires secession to be approved
by a referendum of voters within the entire city. GERALD E. FRUG ET AL., LOCAL GOVERNMENT LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS 433, 439 (5th ed. 2010).

2013]

Neighborhood Empowerment

945

problem, despite the fact that BIDs often cause troubling inequalities
between wealthy and poor neighborhoods in the provision of city services.14
This Article argues that the judicial proclivity to uphold special assessment districts and BIDs while invalidating neighborhood zoning districts is
doctrinally illogical and indefensible as a matter of public policy. Indeed,
because neither the jurisprudence nor the scholarly literature acknowledge
any connection between these two devices, no one to date has undertaken to
defend the disparate treatment accorded them. For purposes of this Article,
I read the doctrine and literature broadly in an effort to divine a basis for
the divergent lines of case law. On this broad reading, it appears that courts
and scholars see the special assessment and BID as essentially voluntary
efforts by neighborhood landowners to provide themselves with supplemental services, while they view zoning as the coercive regulation of land use.15
In addition, courts and commentators seem concerned that if neighborhoods
are empowered to zone land, they will do so in such a way as to impose
undesired impacts on surrounding areas.16 Courts and observers exhibit
much less concern about the spillover impacts of special assessment districts, perhaps because they assume that such districts merely provide one
neighborhood with desired supplemental municipal services and therefore
have minimal negative impacts on neighboring areas.17
As this Article demonstrates, however, these arguments are all seriously
flawed. Initially, I show that special assessments are just as coercive and just
as likely to impose undesirable spillover impacts as neighborhood zoning
districts are. In addition, special assessment districts often present far more
troubling public policy concerns than neighborhood zoning districts.
Specifically, special assessment districts raise the classic Madisonian problem
of a locally dominant majority exploiting a locally vulnerable minority,
whereas neighborhood zoning districts are less likely to raise this problem.
Arguably, therefore, the courts have their standards of review exactly
backward—neighborhood zoning districts deserve more deference than
special assessment districts, not less. This Article does not argue, however,
that courts should simply reverse the current simplistic approach and
14 See Gerald E. Frug, The Seductions of Form, 3 DREXEL L. REV. 11, 17 (2010) (lamenting
that the “almost automatic answer when one seeks to create an organization to improve neighborhood life” is “Let’s create a BID,” and asserting that the BID is simply not applicable to the wide
array of urban challenges and that “we need more options”); Reynolds, supra note 5, at 433-35
(describing the problem of intralocal service inequalities with BIDs and special assessment
districts).
15 See infra notes 132-38 and accompanying text.
16 See infra Section III.C.
17 See infra notes 132-35 and accompanying text.
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declare that all neighborhood zoning districts are valid and all special
assessments districts are infirm. Rather, it proposes that the courts evaluate
the validity of any particular delegation by considering a set of ad hoc
factors that assess the extent to which the delegation creates a risk of
majoritarian exploitation.
In addition to proposing a new approach to the delegation question, the
Article more broadly reexamines the legal status of the neighborhood and
particularly the relationship between neighborhoods and municipalities.
This Article is part of a larger project which explores the question of why
courts have granted incorporated municipalities a privileged status that they
deny to unincorporated neighborhoods, notwithstanding that many municipalities are themselves little more than glorified neighborhoods. Here, the
judicial skepticism toward neighborhood control of zoning contrasts sharply
with a long tradition in which courts have broadly deferred to land use
determinations by municipalities.
As before, this distinction between neighborhoods and municipalities
seems tenuous as a legal matter and almost backwards as a matter of public
policy. A scheme in which neighborhood groups enjoy some limited powers
under the oversight of a larger municipal authority could be a far superior
system of local government than our existing one, in which scores of
autonomous suburbs each have carte blanche to make their own land use
and fiscal policies without any regard for their neighbors or the general
welfare of the region. A revised scheme would also, incidentally, enable
cities to compete on a more level economic footing with incorporated
suburban communities.
Part I provides some background on the special assessment district and
the neighborhood zoning district, revealing the ways in which these devices
are functionally symmetrical. Part II then chronicles the wholly divergent
paths courts have taken in analyzing special assessment districts and neighborhood zoning districts. Part III examines several possible means of reconciling the two doctrinal lines, but concludes by only deepening the mystery:
special assessment districts actually present much greater cause for judicial
skepticism than neighborhood zoning districts. This Part then sets forth
some analytical tools that courts should use to determine on an ad hoc basis
when a delegation of power to a neighborhood group raises red flags.
Finally, Part IV broadens the inquiry to the question of neighborhood
empowerment more generally, concluding that little justification exists for a
jurisprudence that grants incorporated municipalities such an elevated
normative position over unincorporated neighborhoods.
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I. MANAGING LOCAL EXTERNALITIES BY DEVOLVING
POWER TO LANDOWNERS
A. Neighbors and Externalities
The aim of this Part is to show that neighborhood zoning districts and
special assessment districts are, at their core, symmetrical mechanisms for
dealing with local “externalities.”18 A pair of simple examples will illustrate
the basic externality problem. If my neighbor maintains a carefully manicured front lawn, I enjoy for free the aesthetic benefits of her activity. If, by
contrast, my neighbor covers her lawn with junk and debris to express her
opposition to mass consumer culture, it becomes a blight on the entire
neighborhood.19 Both of these activities are called externalities (a positive
and negative externality, respectively)20 because, in either case, the impact
of my neighbor’s activity on my property is irrelevant to her decision
whether or not to undertake the activity. In the first example, although I
benefit from my neighbor’s landscaping, she is unable to seek payment from
me for the benefits I have obtained. As a result, if it proves unprofitable for
my neighbor to continue tending her lawn, she may cease doing so even if I
and many other neighbors derive substantial benefits from it.21 Likewise, in
the second example, although my neighbor’s junk-strewn lawn causes me
significant harm, she is immune to the costs it imposes on me absent
nuisance liability, which rarely covers aesthetic harms.22 She will continue

18 On the concept of externalities generally, see N. GREGORY MANKIW, PRINCIPLES OF
MICROECONOMICS 195-213 (6th ed. 2008). On the significance of externalities to land use
regulation, see ROBERT COOTER & THOMAS ULEN, LAW & E CONOMICS 43-45, 110-11, 174-76
(5th ed. 2008); JESSE DUKEMINIER ET AL., PROPERTY 46-50 (7th ed. 2010). On externalities
and the related issue of “public goods,” see KENNETH A. SHEPSLE & MARK S. BONCHEK,
ANALYZING POLITICS: RATIONALITY, BEHAVIOR, AND I NSTITUTIONS 260-96 (1997).
19 This hypothetical is loosely inspired by the case of People v. Stover, 191 N.E.2d 272, 273
(N.Y. 1963), in which homeowners hung laundry in their front yards to protest high property
taxes. The court held that a municipal ordinance that prohibited hanging laundry in front yards,
passed in the wake of the protests, did not violate the First Amendment. Id. at 276-77.
20 On positive and negative externalities, see MANKIW, supra note 18, at 195-201; and SHEPSLE
& BONCHEK, supra note 18, at 278.
21 This problem is the central concern of Richard Musgrave’s classic work on public finance,
The Theory of Public Finance. As Musgrave puts it, “Establishment of an expensive store may
increase real estate values in the neighborhood, even though the store cannot collect for the
services thus rendered. . . . Since the market permits a price to be charged for only a part of the
services rendered, the development may be unprofitable from the private, but profitable from the
public, point of view.” RICHARD A. MUSGRAVE, THE THEORY OF P UBLIC FINANCE 7 (1959).
22 See, e.g., DUKEMINIER ET AL., supra note 18, at 738 (“Most courts hold that unsightliness
alone does not a nuisance make . . . .”); ELLICKSON & BEEN, supra note 5, at 519 (“Traditional
nuisance law did not protect aesthetic sensibilities.”).
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to foul our collective landscape with little regard for my well-being as long
as doing so is beneficial to herself.23
While homeowners understandably treasure their aesthetic environment, often more is at stake than just appearances. Studies consistently
demonstrate that just about any change in the character of one’s neighborhood can have a quantifiable impact—either positive or negative—on local
property values. In my hypothetical, for example, my neighbor’s wellmaintained lawn may increase my home’s value, whereas her junk-strewn
lawn may diminish it. William Fischel details the extent of this “capitalization” phenomenon: studies have shown that traffic congestion, high crime
rates, large housing projects, and local air pollution decreased property
values, while growth controls, high-quality local schools, and “[h]aving
homeowners rather than renters as neighbors” demonstrably increased home
values.24 Property owners, and homeowners in particular, are therefore
keenly interested in any neighborhood change, since, for many individuals,
the home is by far the most valuable asset they own.25
For these reasons, neighborhoods prize the ability to bring in positive
externalities—that is, improvements and land uses that residents believe
will increase property values and enhance quality of life—and to keep out
negative externalities—land uses that they believe will decrease property
values, increase traffic and noise, and diminish quality of life. To achieve
these ends, however, neighborhoods must somehow “internalize” the costs
and benefits of those impacts.26 Specifically, they need the power to coerce
landowners who benefit from positive externalities, such as the hypothetical
well-maintained lawn, to pay for the benefit they receive.27 At the same
time, neighborhoods require the ability to force those who generate negative externalities, such as the junk-strewn lawn, to absorb the cost that their

23

For a theoretical exercise illustrating negative externalities in land use, see DUKEMINIER

ET AL., supra note 18, at 46-50.
24 FISCHEL, supra note 1,

at 45-46; see also Ellickson, supra note 2, at 92 (asserting that the
provision of local “public goods” will cause property values in the area to rise).
25 See FISCHEL, supra note 1, at 8-12 (providing a range of reasons why homeowners are
unusually concerned about and willing to take action to prevent potential harms to their homes by
negative externalities); William A. Fischel, Why Are There NIMBYs?, 77 LAND ECON. 144, 146
(2001) [hereinafter Fischel, NIMBYs] (reporting that the “vast majority of mature households”
have all of their savings in their homes).
26 See MANKIW, supra note 18, at 195-201 (discussing the problem of internalizing externalities).
27 This question—how benefitted parties can be made to pay their fair share for benefits that
are nonrivalrous and nonexcludable—is one of the central inquiries in public finance. See generally
MUSGRAVE, supra note 21, at 7-8 (providing examples of developments that are profitable from a
public, but not a private, point of view).
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deleterious activity imposes on their neighbors.28 Over the last few decades,
the deed-restricted homeowners association has soared in popularity
because it provides neighborhoods with precisely these powers. The homeowners association protects property values and community quality of life
by charging mandatory assessments on all homeowners to pay for the
provision of positive amenities, such as swimming pools, tennis courts, and
gardens, and by strictly regulating the use of land to prevent negative
externalities.29
For many neighborhoods, however, the homeowners association is unavailable. In older neighborhoods that were developed without deed
restrictions binding each parcel of land to a homeowners association,
retroactively creating one is nearly impossible because doing so would
require the unanimous consent of all the homeowners in the neighborhood.
Economic theory postulates that obtaining unanimity in this situation
among any group larger than a few landowners is very difficult because each
landowner will have incentives to “hold out” from the agreement.30 For
example, if a sufficient number of neighborhood residents are willing to pay
for the maintenance of my next-door neighbor’s front lawn, then I might
28 This second question—how to make the generator of negative externalities consider the
costs imposed on others—is one of the central problems in land use control. See, e.g., WILLIAM A.
FISCHEL, THE ECONOMICS OF ZONING LAWS 234-37 (1985) (describing and critiquing
traditional empirical analyses of the relationship between externalities and zoning).
29 See, e.g., NELSON, supra note 12, at 46, 52-55, 74-76 (detailing the increasing popularity of
homeowners associations, the “covenants, conditions, and restrictions” through which these
associations regulate land use, and the “public” services these associations provide). There is a vast
literature on the virtues and vices of homeowners associations. See, e.g., EVAN MCKENZIE,
PRIVATOPIA (1994); Robert C. Ellickson, Cities and Homeowners Associations, 130 U. PA. L. REV.
1519, 1521-26 (1982) (describing similarities between local governments and homeowners associations and asserting that voluntariness of homeowners associations is the key distinction between
them); Lee Anne Fennell, Contracting Communities, 2004 U. ILL. L. REV. 829, 849-64 (describing
how uniform rules in private developments make it hard for consumers to be fully satisfied with
the developments in which they live); Clayton P. Gillette, Courts, Covenants, and Communities, 61
U. CHI. L. REV. 1375, 1388-93 (1994) (describing some of the benefits of providing public goods
through homeowners associations rather than local governments, including that homeowners
associations can satisfy minority preferences and allocate resources better than local governments).
This literature is outside the scope of the present Article, however, which focuses on the ability of
neighborhoods to control their own externalities where forming a homeowners association is
difficult or impossible.
30 See, e.g., Ellickson, supra note 2, at 79 (“When relevant owners and residents are heterogeneous and more numerous than a dozen or two, their efforts at voluntary coordination are likely
to be beset by significant free rider problems.”); Robert H. Nelson, Privatizing the Neighborhood: A
Proposal to Replace Zoning with Private Collective Property Rights to Existing Neighborhoods, 7 GEO.
MASON L. REV. 827, 833 (1999) (noting that the creation of homeowners associations in
established neighborhoods is virtually impossible because “the transactions costs of assembling
unanimous neighborhood consents voluntarily would be prohibitive”).
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decline to agree, thereby continuing to enjoy the presence of the nice lawn
without having to pay. Similarly, if a sufficient number of my neighbors are
willing to place restrictions on their land to prevent unkempt yards, then I
may benefit from the assurance that my neighbors’ lawns will remain
pristine while keeping my own lot free of restrictions. The specter of this
rogue “holdout” or “free rider” will deter otherwise agreeable landowners
from joining the association out of fear that they will be forced to pay for a
benefit that others obtain for free. Given the choice, most individuals in
such a situation will opt not to join the homeowners association, even if it
means that everyone in the neighborhood continues to suffer because of the
inability to manage local externalities.31 This quandary can be overcome,
according to the orthodox economic view, only by coercing unanimity
through some sort of regulatory scheme.32
The typical regulatory scheme used to overcome this collective action
problem is a combination of zoning and ad valorem taxation. Through
zoning, the municipality simply dictates the permissible land uses in each
neighborhood without the consent of the affected landowners, thereby
addressing the negative externality problem.33 Through ad valorem taxation,
the municipality levies a charge on landowners in proportion to the assessed
value of their property to pay for the benefits all municipal residents
receive, again without the consent of the assessed, thus solving the positive
externality problem.34 As the Introduction pointed out, this scheme has
worked well for landowners in small, incorporated suburbs, where zoning
can ensure a fairly homogeneous landowning population with uniform
service needs. Landowners have been far less satisfied, however, with the
governance of large cities, in which their clout is diminished by a more
diverse population and a variety of strong interest groups that make competing demands on municipal government.35
31 This scenario is an example of the classic prisoner’s dilemma described in the economics
literature, in which cooperation between individuals is defeated because each mistrusts the other’s
willingness to value the collective self-interest above the individual self-interest, causing each to
opt for individual self-interest even though all would have been better off cooperating. See
MANKIW, supra note 18, at 355-62.
32 See, e.g., Ellickson, supra note 2, at 93 (proposing to overcome the free rider problem
through a block-level improvement district—or BLID, inspired by BIDs—in which all benefitted
owners would be required to pay assessments, regardless of consent); Nelson, supra note 30, at 83334 (proposing to overcome the holdout problem by allowing the creation of homeowners
associations through a neighborhood election requiring less than unanimous consent).
33 See Nelson, supra note 30, at 840-41, 844-45 (explaining how zoning is used in existing
neighborhoods to overcome the holdout and free rider problems coercively).
34 See MUSGRAVE, supra note 21, at 9-10 (identifying taxation as the traditional means of
financing public goods).
35 See supra note 2.
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City officials, seeking to prevent tax-paying landowners from fleeing to
adjacent suburbs, have attempted to placate those landowners by giving
them the direct power to approve or veto neighborhood changes, freeing the
landowners from the need to lobby city hall. Of most significance for
present purposes, cities have devised two complementary devices that
appear ideally tailored to satisfy landowners’ desires: (1) the neighborhood
zoning district, which enables landowners to directly manage negative local
externalities; and (2) the special assessment district, which empowers them
to directly manage positive local externalities.
B. The Neighborhood Zoning District
The most common type of neighborhood zoning district provides that
any landowner who desires to use his or her land in a designated manner
(say, to operate a nightclub or tavern) must obtain the consent of the
owners of some percentage of the land within a certain radius from the
proposed land use.36 This type of zoning device is often referred to as a
“one-shot deal.”37 The affected landowners cast a one-time vote on one
proposed development. Afterwards, the district ceases to perform any
further functions, unless another land use subject to the referendum provision is proposed for the same site. Frequently, the land use or uses subject
to the jurisdiction of the zoning district will be something that is considered
a “Locally Undesirable Land Use” (LULU)—that is, a land use with the
potential to impose significant negative externalities, such as increased noise,
traffic congestion, or decreased property values, on the surrounding area.38
Although the one-shot deal has been most common, in principle the
neighborhood zoning district could be constructed as a continuing governmental entity. Robert Nelson, for example, has proposed that landowners
36 Cf. Fred P. Bosselman, The Commodification of “Nature’s Metropolis”: The Historical Context
of Illinois’ Unique Zoning Standards, 12 N. ILL. U. L. REV. 527, 567-72 (1992) (describing the
earliest examples of “frontage consent” ordinances in late nineteenth- and early twentieth-century
Chicago).
37 See Michael Heller & Rick Hills, Land Assembly Districts, 121 HARV. L. REV. 1465, 1512-26
(2008) (explaining the “one-shot deal” concept and elaborating on its use in a variety of land use
contexts, including neighborhood zoning and business improvement districts).
38 See, e.g., Washington ex rel. Seattle Title Trust Co. v. Roberge, 278 U.S. 116, 117-18 (1928)
(examining a local zoning measure requiring the consent of property owners before establishing
group homes for children and the elderly in a mostly residential zone); Shannon v. City of
Forsyth, 666 P.2d 750, 751 (Mont. 1983) (considering a zoning ordinance barring mobile homes
from certain residential zones unless eighty percent of nearby owners provided consent); Davis v.
Blount Cnty. Beer Bd., 621 S.W.2d 149, 150 (Tenn. 1981) (analyzing a county resolution barring
the sale of beer within 300 feet of residential dwellings, should the owner of one of those
residences object).
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within a particular submunicipal territory should be permitted to create, by
petition, a “Neighborhood Association in an Established Neighborhood”
(NASSEN).39 Once the NASSEN is created, landowners within the
NASSEN’s territorial jurisdiction would have the power to vote on any
proposed zoning changes within the district.40 Nelson’s scheme does not
appear to have been widely adopted, although a few cities have attempted to
delegate ongoing zoning powers to defined neighborhood groups.41
C. The Special Assessment District
The “special assessment district” is a device that permits a municipality
to provide an improvement that confers a “special benefit” on property in
the vicinity, and then to assess the benefitted property owners for the cost
of the improvement.42 For example, if a sewer line servicing a residential
development of fifty homes needs repair, the municipality could perform
the repair and then assess the fifty homeowners for the cost.43 Traditionally,
the special assessment was also a one-shot deal. The city would assess a
one-time charge to finance a one-time physical improvement.44 Furthermore, the traditional special assessment usually provided improvements
that were placed on or abutting the benefitted land—such as streets or
sewers.45 In modern times, however, the special assessment has been applied
much more broadly. For example, the assessment may finance the provision
of positive externalities, such as sanitation or security services that generally
benefit the assessed area, or the erection of an improvement, such as a rail
station, that promises to increase economic activity or property values in

39
40
41

NELSON, supra note 12, at 265-67.
Id. at 267.
See, e.g., Schulz v. Milne, 849 F. Supp. 708, 712 (N.D. Cal. 1994) (analyzing the constitutionality of a neighborhood review board de facto empowered by the city to approve all new
zoning changes); Rispo Inv. Co. v. City of Seven Hills, 629 N.E.2d 3, 5-6 (Ohio Ct. App. 1993)
(examining zoning measures requiring that proposed zoning changes be approved by both a
majority of voters citywide and in the affected ward).
42 For introductory material on special assessment districts, see supra note 5.
43 For a typical example of a special assessment involving sewer lines, see Strauss v. Township of Holmdel, 711 A.2d 1385, 1388 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1997).
44 See Reynolds, supra note 5, at 399 (describing the evolution of the special assessment from
its origins as a “one-time fixed charge”).
45 See Stephen Diamond, The Death and Transfiguration of Benefit Taxation: Special Assessments
in Nineteenth-Century America, 12 J. LEGAL STUD. 201, 203-06 (1983) (recounting early special
assessments whose benefits could be easily traced to specific properties); Reynolds, supra note 5, at
398 (noting that, traditionally, improvements paid for by special assessment had to benefit the
assessed property “over and above” the advantage the whole community would derive from the
improvements).
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the area.46 In addition, the modern special assessment district may not
necessarily be a one-shot deal, but could be an ongoing operation that
assesses a regular charge against landowners for provision of a continuing
service.47 One widely used modern incarnation of the special assessment
district, the BID, requires assessed landowners to pay a recurring charge to
an association, which then uses the funds to perform a wide array of ongoing services for the benefit of the assessed landowners.48 The BID has
traditionally operated in downtown business areas, but several scholars have
proposed expanding the concept to allow residential areas to create, by
petition of a percentage of landowners, an improvement district that is
empowered to levy assessments on neighborhood residents in order to
provide collective amenities on an ongoing basis.49 The neighborhood or
block-front improvement district appears to have gained popularity in
recent years.50
A city may impose a special assessment or BID on the benefitted
landowners without their consent, but the more common course is for a
percentage of the nearby property owners to petition the city to create the
assessment district.51 Even where such a petition is not formally required, it
is rare for a city to create such a district without the approval of a significant
percentage of the assessed landowners.52 In many cases, the city’s decision
to create a special assessment district is subject to a referendum by a
percentage of the landowners to be assessed (usually a majority or supermajority).53 For special assessment districts like BIDs, which operate on an
ongoing basis, a board of directors is either elected or appointed to manage
the budget and operations of the district.54 Even when the board is appointed,
46 Cf. Reynolds, supra note 5, at 399-400 (listing examples of benefits funded through modern special assessments, like fire protection services).
47 Id. at 399.
48 Briffault, supra note 2, at 517.
49 See Ellickson, supra note 2, at 97-98, 100-01 (proposing services and regulations that could
be administered by a local improvement district); Liebmann, supra note 12, at 351-64 (suggesting a
number of amenities and services that private neighborhood groups could provide).
50 See Richard Briffault, The Business Improvement District Comes of Age, 3 DREXEL L. REV.
19, 21-24 (2010) (noting the sprouting of Philadelphia BIDs in a wide variety of residential
neighborhoods, including low-income, minority neighborhoods).
51 Reynolds, supra note 5, at 404.
52 See id. (“BIDs are rarely, if ever, formed over the objection of a majority of the property
owners.”); see also Briffault, supra note 6, at 381-84 (describing the large role existing businesses
and chambers of commerce play in how BIDs are formed in practice).
53 See Briffault, supra note 6, at 379-80 (describing how landowners within a proposed BID
often have the opportunity to veto its creation if a significant fraction of them file written protests
within a specified time period).
54 See id. at 409-10, 413 (describing the different types of boards of special assessment districts, from advisory to nonprofit district management associations).
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it tends to be dominated by landowners.55 For the purposes of this Article, I
ignore the less common variety of special assessment district in which the
city simply imposes the assessment without the consent of assessed landowners.
D. Capitalization, Coercion, and the Public Choice Regulatory Model
The preceding sketch illustrates some of the ways in which the neighborhood zoning district and the special assessment district are conceptually
symmetrical. First, both devices provide landowners with the ability to
manage local externalities directly. Neighborhood zoning districts permit a
percentage of neighboring landowners to keep out (or be paid to allow in)
an undesirable new entrant that presumptively causes them disproportionate
harm as a result of its proximity; similarly, special assessment districts
permit a percentage of neighboring landowners to bring in (if they pay) a
desirable new entrant that presumptively brings them disproportionate benefits as a result of its proximity. Second, both devices enable large, diverse
cities to capture some of the governance advantages of small, homogeneous
suburbs. Devolving direct power over a local land use change to nearby
landowners circumvents potential interest-group conflicts prevalent in a
diverse city by homogenizing the voting population and thereby ensuring a
general consistency of preferences.
The assumption that restricting the franchise to nearby landowners will
result in a more uniform set of preferences rests implicitly on the theory of
capitalization. According to this theory, the positive or negative impacts of
neighborhood change will be reflected in the property values of local
landowners whose land is closest to the proposed change.56 If all proximate
landowners stand collectively to gain or to lose from a proposed new
entrant to the neighborhood, they are likely to share similar views on
whether to welcome that entrant.57 Capitalization also provides a normative
basis for limiting the franchise to proximate landowners. Although tenants,
employees, visitors, business owners, or others may have a stake in how the
neighborhood manages change, capitalization theory holds that none of
55 See id. at 412-13 (noting that “[b]usinesspeople, especially landowners, generally dominate
the membership of these boards, even when that is not required by state enabling legislation”
because an appointments process or an election process may be limited to landowners).
56 See Thomas W. Merrill, Direct Voting by Property Owners, 77 U. CHI. L. REV. 275, 294
(2010) (“[T]he value of local collective goods is capitalized in the price of homes.”).
57 See, e.g., id. at 298 (arguing that a proposal to create a historic preservation district has a
fairly uniform impact on landowners’ property values and “puts everyone in the district in the
same boat”).
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these groups is affected as acutely as landowners, since any land use change
will directly impact their property values.58 Both the special assessment
district and the neighborhood zoning district rely implicitly on capitalization to rationalize confining the franchise to landowners based on their
disproportionate interest in proximate land use changes.59
The most critical similarity between neighborhood zoning districts and
special assessment districts, however, is that both devices have a strongly
coercive component. Unanimity is rarely required for either of these
entities to act. Rather, some percentage of a district’s landowners, usually
those who own a majority or supermajority of the area’s property, have the
power to impose their will on the rest. As I have stressed, orthodox economic theory considers this coercive element to be absolutely essential in
overcoming the collective action problem that besets the management of
local externalities—without coercion, individual landowners will be enticed
to hold out or free ride on the efforts of their neighbors.60
58 Id. at 294. While some have argued that limiting the right to vote on land use changes to
nearby landowners is undemocratic, defenders of such a limit answer that doing so is legitimate
where a land use change is likely to affect property values, because landowners have a disproportionate stake in the outcome. See, e.g., Ellickson, supra note 2, at 90-95 (responding to “hyperegalitarian” criticism of landowner voting with historical examples of the practice and by
contending that landowners bear the bulk of the benefits or costs of a board’s decisions); Merrill,
supra note 56, at 297 (arguing that the creation of a historic preservation district has “trivial or
speculative” effects on nonlandowners “compared to the primary benefits and costs, which are
borne by members of the community”). Merrill further argues that limiting the franchise is
legitimate because doing so “is likely to select a pool of voters who have a strong incentive to
inform themselves about any issue that will have a significant impact on property values.” Merrill,
supra note 56, at 294. This same logic informs the Supreme Court’s jurisprudence exempting
certain “special-purpose” municipal entities from the “one person, one vote” rule of Reynolds v.
Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 558 (1964) (internal quotation omitted), on the grounds that they disproportionately affect landowners. See infra text accompanying notes 95-105.
59 On the special assessment district and capitalization, see, for example, Kessler v. Grand
Cent. Dist. Mgmt. Ass’n, 158 F.3d 92, 108 (2d Cir. 1998) (“The principal economic benefit from
[the BID’s] activities . . . plainly accrues to the property owners, who will enjoy an increase in
the value of their property.”); Ellickson, supra note 2, at 92-93 (arguing that property owners
should be given an exclusive franchise in a “block-level institution” charged with providing
localized public goods, because landowners are the primary beneficiaries via capitalization). For a
similar discussion relating to neighborhood zoning districts, see, for example, Davis v. Blount
Cnty. Beer Bd., 621 S.W.2d 149, 152 (Tenn. 1981) (upholding an ordinance conditioning approval
of a tavern on nearby owners’ decision not to protest the approval, reasoning that “[i]t has been
recognized that the . . . existence of [a LULU] in close proximity to the property of others may
adversely affect the value of their property”).
60 See, e.g., Briffault, supra note 6, at 394 (“The coercive assessment is essential to the BID.”);
Ellickson, supra note 2, at 93, 107 (proposing to overcome the free rider problem through BLIDs,
in which all affected owners would be required to pay assessments, regardless of whether they
agreed to the creation of the district, and acknowledging that the BLID proposal involves
coercion); Nelson, supra note 30, at 833-34 (proposing a mechanism by which homeowners
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Ultimately, both the neighborhood zoning district and the special assessment district obtain their legitimacy from a “public choice” model of local
government. Under this model, a free market, in which individuals transact
based on their ability and willingness to pay, is the ideal provider of virtually
all goods and services; state coercion is legitimate only to the extent that it
is necessary to overcome a structural incapacity of the market to satisfy
individual preferences.61 The state, in other words, is merely a continuation
of the market by other means.62 It exists solely to enable individuals to
safeguard their economic self-interest where the market fails to do so.
In the case of the neighborhood zoning district and special assessment
district, the public choice model would consider government coercion of
dissenting landowners a legitimate form of market substitution because
collective action problems (of either the holdout or free-rider variety)
frustrate the economic interests of all the neighborhood landowners by
making it impossible for them to internalize the costs of local externalities.
By the same token, public choice theory would rationalize the restriction of
the franchise to landowners on the grounds that, in line with the notion of
capitalization, the only reason government coercion is justified at all is to
protect the landowners whose property values are bedeviled by externality
problems.
Given the similarities between the special assessment district and the
neighborhood zoning district, one would expect courts to treat them
similarly. Indeed, as we will see in the next Part, when considering the
validity of these devices, courts have generally acknowledged the publicchoice logic underlying them. Specifically, courts have implicitly accepted
the premise that landowners are disproportionately interested in land use
changes or new improvements in their neighborhoods. Courts also recognize that both devices are designed to enable nearby landowners to protect
the value of their own property. However, as the next Part shows, courts
follow these premises to diametrically opposed conclusions. The majority of
court decisions hold neighborhood zoning districts to be constitutionally
associations would be created by less than unanimous consent, thereby addressing the difficulties
of collective action).
61 See Frank I. Michelman, Political Markets and Community Self-Determination: Competing
Judicial Models of Local Government Legitimacy, 53 IND. L.J. 145, 155-57 (1977–1978) (describing the
public choice model and providing an example of how it applies in the context of community
organizations). On the application of public choice theory to law generally, see DANIEL A.
FARBER & PHILIP P. FRICKEY, LAW AND PUBLIC CHOICE: A C RITICAL INTRODUCTION
(1991); MAXWELL L. STEARNS & TODD J. ZYWICKI, PUBLIC CHOICE CONCEPTS AND
APPLICATIONS IN LAW (2009).
62 See Michelman, supra note 61, at 148 (“In the public choice model, . . . [t]he legislature is
conceived as a market-like arena in which votes instead of money are the medium of exchange.”).
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infirm because of the likelihood that landowners will make decisions based
on their own self-interest. By contrast, almost all courts uphold the constitutionality of special assessment districts in which landowners enjoy
disproportionate power on essentially the same grounds—that their amplified voice is justified by their greater interest.
This inconsistency has persisted in the jurisprudence, unresolved and
ignored by scholars, because the courts have developed two entirely distinct
doctrines to analyze these two devices. Courts scrutinize neighborhood
zoning districts under an anachronistic “delegation” doctrine that prohibits
the devolution of regulatory power to evidently self-interested parties. In
contrast, courts analyze special assessment districts under a more generous
doctrine that recognizes the practical need for municipalities to indulge the
parochial interests of the property owners who pay the city’s bills. In short,
it appears that the cases dealing with the neighborhood zoning district reject
the public choice model entirely, whereas the cases dealing with the special
assessment district accept it. These two doctrinal lines seem to exist in
parallel juridical universes, neither one acknowledging the other or recognizing their incompatibility.
II. PUBLIC CHOICE AND THE JURISPRUDENCE
OF NEIGHBORHOOD EMPOWERMENT
A. Neighborhood Zoning and Standardless Delegation: Revisiting the
Eubank-Cusack-Roberge Riddle
The fate of neighborhood zoning districts was sealed by a series of cryptic
Supreme Court decisions from the early twentieth century. Zoning first
appeared in American cities in the late nineteenth century in response to
the dual pressures of urbanization and industrialization. An exploding urban
population and growing industrial and commercial land development
resulted in a sharp increase in land use conflicts.63 Of particular concern to
city leaders was the effect of new development on the stability of property
values in existing neighborhoods with relatively uniform, low-intensity
land use patterns, such as single-family residential districts.64 Potential
63 See, e.g., SEYMOUR I. TOLL, ZONED AMERICAN 74-116 (1969) (describing how changing land use patterns on Fifth Avenue in New York City threatened affluent residential and
commercial neighborhoods, leading to adoption of first comprehensive zoning ordinance).
64 Cf. Bosselman, supra note 36, at 569-70 (explaining that the threat of undesirable uses
invading residential areas made homeowners nervous, and “[n]ervous neighbors were bad for the
business of people who developed or sold real estate because the perception of security carries a
high economic value, and nervousness lowers real estate prices”).
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homeowners considering whether to purchase a home in such neighborhoods would surely be wary of purchasing a plot of land that accrued a
significant portion of its value from the low-intensity homogeneity of the
surrounding neighborhood absent some assurance that the neighborhood
would remain homogeneous—particularly during an era when neighborhoods were rapidly changing due to the introduction of ever more intense
land uses.65 To address this problem, Chicago pioneered the earliest form of
zoning ordinance, the “block-front consent” scheme. In 1887, Chicago
enacted an ordinance that prohibited new livery stables within 75 feet of
any residential area unless the owners of all property within 600 feet
consented in writing.66 The Illinois Supreme Court upheld this scheme in
City of Chicago v. Stratton, reasoning that “[i]n matters of purely local
concern the parties immediately interested may fairly be supposed to be
more competent to judge of their needs than any central authority.”67
Stratton thus appears to endorse the public-choice logic that “immediately
interested” parties should be permitted to determine their own “needs.”
However, the United States Supreme Court’s 1912 decision in Eubank v.
City of Richmond68 cast Stratton into serious doubt. In Eubank, the Court
held that a zoning ordinance enacted by the city of Richmond, Virginia,
permitting the owners of two-thirds of the property abutting any street to
establish a setback line for buildings on the street was an unconstitutional
delegation of power.69 The Court reasoned that the ordinance permitted
“one set of property owners to control the property right of others” without
providing any limitation on those owners’ authority.70 Absent any standards, property owners could exercise the zoning power “solely for their own
interest or even capriciously.”71 In rejecting landowners’ “own interest” as a
decisionmaking standard, Eubank apparently repudiated the underlying
public-choice premise of the neighborhood zoning district, which is that
landowners should have a voice in proximate land use changes precisely
because they are the ones most interested.
Stratton was distinguishable from Eubank in that the ordinance at issue
in Stratton did not permit landowners to establish a land use regulation, but

65 See, e.g., id. at 570-71 (describing the threat livery stables posed to Chicago’s residential
neighborhoods in the late nineteenth century).
66 Id. at 570.
67 44 N.E. 853, 855 (Ill. 1896).
68 226 U.S. 137 (1912).
69 Id. at 141, 144.
70 Id. at 144.
71 Id. at 145.
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allowed them simply to waive an otherwise applicable restriction.72 In a
later case also involving Chicago, Thomas Cusack Co. v. City of Chicago,73 the
Supreme Court seemingly salvaged Stratton. The Court upheld a municipal
ordinance prohibiting the erection of a billboard in any predominantly
residential district without the consent of the owners of a majority of the
frontage on the street where the billboard was to be erected.74 The Court
distinguished Eubank by noting that the Richmond ordinance had empowered neighbors to impose restrictions, whereas the Chicago ordinance under
review empowered neighbors only to lift an otherwise applicable restriction.75
The distinction between a valid waiver and an invalid imposition, tenuous from the beginning, was apparently abolished in the last of the Supreme
Court’s cases on neighborhood zoning districts, the 1928 case of Washington
ex rel. Seattle Title Trust Co. v. Roberge.76 There, the Court considered an
ordinance that prohibited the construction of certain types of group homes
in areas zoned for single-family residences, but allowed this prohibition to
be lifted with the consent of the owners of two-thirds of the property
within four hundred feet of the proposed location of the group home.77 The
Court invalidated the ordinance.78 Although the case more closely resembled Cusack than Eubank, the Court followed Eubank in reasoning that the
ordinance amounted to a standardless delegation—it conferred on one
group of property owners the power to prevent others from using their land
without providing standards to constrain that power in any way.79 The
Court noted that the property owners were “not bound by any official duty,
but are free to withhold consent for selfish reasons or arbitrarily and may
subject the [plaintiff ] to their will or caprice.”80 Like Eubank, then, Roberge
rejected the public-choice premise that landowners should be able to withhold consent for “selfish” reasons such as protecting the value of their
property.81 The Roberge Court distinguished Cusack on the grounds that
billboards—at issue in Cusack—were inherently offensive nuisances, whereas
the record did not establish the per se offensiveness of group homes.82
72
73
74
75
76
77
78
79
80
81
82

See Stratton, 44 N.E. at 855.
242 U.S. 526 (1917).
Id. at 527, 531.
See id. at 531.
278 U.S. 116 (1928).
Id. at 117-18, 122-23.
Id. at 122.
Id. at 121-22.
Id. at 122 (citation omitted).
Id.
Id.
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Making sense of this trio of cases proves exceedingly difficult. While
Eubank and Cusack can perhaps be reconciled, Roberge’s distinction of Cusack
cannot withstand scrutiny. If Roberge is read to mean that cities lack the
power to prohibit group homes in single-family neighborhoods because
group homes are not inherently offensive, then Roberge is plainly inconsistent with the Supreme Court’s landmark ruling in Village of Euclid v.
Ambler Realty Co.,83 decided just two years earlier. In Euclid, the Supreme
Court made clear that zoning authority was not limited to restraining
offensive uses but could be deployed broadly to protect the character of
existing neighborhoods.84 If, on the other hand, Roberge’s concern was not
with the city’s power to prohibit the use in question ab initio but rather
with the validity of a neighborhood plebiscite on whether to waive the
prohibition, then the Court’s distinction of Cusack, which approved a
similar voting scheme, is inexplicable.85 In fact, it seems far more sensible
for a city to give neighbors a vote on whether to waive a land use prohibition where the offensiveness of the use to be prohibited is debatable (as in
Roberge) than where the use is indisputably offensive (as in Cusack). Indeed,
the city would likely be neglecting its duty to protect the public health,
safety, and welfare if it permitted some landowners to impose a plainly
noxious use on their objecting neighbors.
Not surprisingly, both courts and commentators have struggled to make
sense of the doctrine emerging from the Eubank-Cusack-Roberge line of
cases. The majority of courts cite Roberge and Eubank as providing the
applicable rule that direct delegation of the zoning power to neighborhood
groups is prohibited, and either ignore or distinguish Cusack.86 A minority of
83
84

272 U.S. 365 (1926).
See id. at 388 (upholding a zoning ordinance excluding all industrial uses from residential
districts, while recognizing that “it may thereby happen that not only offensive or dangerous
industries will be excluded, but those which are neither offensive nor dangerous will share the
same fate”).
85 See Thomas Cusack Co. v. City of Chicago, 242 U.S. 526, 531 (1917) (“The ordinance in
the case at bar . . . permits this prohibition to be modified with the consent of persons who are to
be most affected by such modification.”).
86 See, e.g., Schulz v. Milne, 849 F. Supp. 708, 711-12 (N.D. Cal. 1994) (holding that the
plaintiff stated a claim of unconstitutional delegation of zoning power to a neighborhood review
board on the authority of Eubank and Roberge); Emmett McLoughlin Realty, Inc. v. Pima County,
58 P.3d 39, 41-42 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2002) (citing Eubank, Roberge, and Cusack and holding that the
ordinance at issue more closely resembled the invalid neighborhood-consent ordinance struck
down by Eubank than the valid waiver ordinance upheld in Cusack); Shannon v. City of Forsyth,
666 P.2d 750, 752 (Mont. 1983) (invalidating a neighbor-consent provision related to the location
of mobile homes under the authority of Eubank and Roberge); Cary v. City of Rapid City, 559
N.W.2d 891, 895-96 (S.D. 1997) (invalidating a neighbor-consent provision under Eubank and
Roberge while ignoring Cusack); Am. Chariot v. City of Memphis, 164 S.W.3d 600, 602-03, 605
(Tenn. Ct. App. 2004) (invalidating a landowner-consent provision allowing restaurant owners to
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courts cite Cusack and uphold such provisions, and likewise either distinguish or ignore Eubank and Roberge.87 Neither group of decisions makes a
convincing case for unifying the doctrine in this area.88 Scholars have fared
little better. Frank Michelman, one of the most distinguished localgovernment scholars, undertook an extensive examination of the three cases
and ultimately concluded that they could not be reconciled.89 Fortunately,
waive a prohibition on where horse-drawn carriages could be located and distinguishing Cusack on
the grounds that the ordinance in this case was for the benefit of the public, while the ordinance in
Cusack was only for the benefit of the local property owners); Williams v. Whitten, 451 S.W.2d
535, 536, 538 (Tex. Civ. App. 1970) (invalidating a neighbor-consent provision respecting the
location of mobile home parks under Roberge); County of Fairfax v. Fleet Indus. Park Ltd. P’ship,
410 S.E.2d 669, 670, 673 (Va. 1991) (invalidating a provision conditioning zoning changes in a
district on the consent of neighbors under Eubank and distinguishing Cusack); Town of Westford
v. Kilburn, 300 A.2d 523, 527 (Vt. 1973) (invalidating a consent provision as a standardless
delegation without citing Eubank, Roberge, or Cusack); cf. Gen. Elec. Co. v. N.Y. State Dep’t of
Labor, 936 F.2d 1448, 1455 (2d Cir. 1991) (“Eubank and Roberge remain good law today.”).
87 See, e.g., Nikolas v. City of Omaha, No. 8:08-87, 2009 WL 529226, at *8-9 (D. Neb. Mar.
2, 2009) (upholding a city code provision prohibiting accessory apartments subject to neighbor
approval as a waiver law under Cusack, without citing Roberge or Eubank); Coffey v. County of
Otoe, 743 N.W.2d 632, 634, 638-39 (Neb. 2008) (upholding under Cusack a neighborhood
“waiver” scheme permitting residences near animal feeding and waste facilities only if mutual
easements were granted, while distinguishing Eubank and discussing Roberge in a tangential
footnote); Rispo Inv. Co. v. City of Seven Hills, 629 N.E.2d 3, 11, 12-13 (Ohio Ct. App. 1993)
(upholding a neighborhood-consent provision under Cusack, among others, while distinguishing
Eubank and Roberge as applicable only to city ordinances and not to city charters granted under
home rule); Davis v. Blount Cnty. Beer Bd., 621 S.W.2d 149, 150, 151-52 (Tenn. 1981) (upholding
under Cusack a consent provision under which a neighbor can veto a proposed permit to sell beer,
while distinguishing Eubank and citing Roberge once in a “see also”); cf. Hornstein v. Barry, 560
A.2d 530, 531, 536-37 (D.C. 1989) (en banc) (upholding a provision conditioning the conversion of
apartment buildings to condominiums on the consent of a majority of existing tenants, relying on
Cusack and distinguishing Roberge and Eubank). But cf. id. at 540 (Ferren, J., dissenting) (arguing
that Roberge rather than Cusack is the applicable rule); id. at 542-43 (Reilly, J., dissenting in part)
(same).
88 There is some suggestion in the case law and other literature that the “rule” emerging
from the Eubank-Cusack-Roberge line is that “consent provisions are valid if they waive a previously
applicable zoning restriction, but are invalid if they impose a new zoning restriction.” DANIEL R.
MANDELKER, LAND USE LAW § 6.04 (5th ed. 2003); cf. Howard Twp. Bd. of Trs. v. Waldo,
425 N.W.2d 180, 184 (Mich. Ct. App. 1988) (per curiam) (stating the rule that waiver provisions
are generally valid but holding that a provision requiring consent from 100% of neighbors was in
any event unreasonable). This is a dubious statement of the applicable legal rule. It completely
disregards the Roberge case, which itself invalidated a “waiver” provision and which, as the most
recent of the three Supreme Court decisions, is likely the most authoritative. The stated rule also
ignores the substantial number of cases cited supra note 86 in which courts have relied on Roberge
to invalidate neighborhood waiver provisions. As a matter of principle, moreover, the distinction
between a “waiver” and an “imposition” is imperceptible and formalistic. In either case, landowners
are directly empowered to determine whether to permit a particular land use in proximity to their
own properties.
89 See Michelman, supra note 61, at 164-87 (analyzing these cases and others alternatively
under a “public choice” and a “public interest” model, and concluding that neither satisfactorily
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for the purposes of this Article, I need not sort out the doctrinal mess these
precedents have created. My concern here is how, if at all, we can reconcile
the courts’ generally skeptical attitude toward neighborhood zoning districts
with their permissive approach to special assessment districts. Cusack may
prove relevant for this discussion later, but for now I focus on Eubank,
Roberge, and their progeny.
If we take the reasoning of Eubank and Roberge at face value, the trouble
with neighborhood zoning districts is their public-choice foundation—that
landowners are permitted to exercise regulatory power in accordance with
their own selfish interests rather than some conception of the public good.
Assuming that is a legitimate concern, however, it should also raise doubts
about the validity of special assessment districts, which likewise empower
proximate landowners to effectuate their own self-interest. Nevertheless,
special assessment districts have managed to evade the scrutiny of the
Roberge doctrine because courts use an entirely distinct doctrinal framework
to assess those devices—a framework in which the self-interest of the
enfranchised landowners is considered a point in favor of a district’s validity.
B. Special Assessments, BIDs, and the “One Person, One Vote” Rule
The special assessment is of an older vintage than zoning, having been
used since before the Civil War as a means of financing municipal improvements.90 Aside from a brief, late–nineteenth century foray by the Supreme
Court into special assessment doctrine, the area has traditionally been the
province of the state courts.91 Federal courts again entered the fray, however,

explains the Roberge trio). For a more extensive discussion of Michelman’s analysis, see infra text
accompanying notes 190-94.
90 See JACKSON, supra note 1, at 131 (describing the use of special assessments to fund street
pavement in the mid-nineteenth century and later efforts to shift infrastructure costs to municipalities); Diamond, supra note 45, at 206-10 (explaining the factors that led to the use of special
assessments, particularly in New York, and describing how early courts saw special assessments in
a variety of different lights, such as examples of taxation or as private funding of private benefits);
see also supra notes 44-45.
91 Toward the close of the nineteenth century, the Supreme Court briefly intervened in
special assessment law to require that special assessments be supported by a fairly exacting
calculation of the special benefits received by each landowner. See Norwood v. Baker, 172 U.S.
269, 290-92 (1898) (invalidating an assessment “because it rested upon a basis that excluded any
consideration of benefits”). However, just a few years later, the Court reversed course and held
that courts should broadly defer to legislative judgments about benefit, which it deemed “a matter
of forecast and estimate.” Louisville & Nashville R.R. v. Barber Asphalt Paving Co., 197 U.S. 430,
433-34 (1905). From that time until the emergence of the “one person, one vote” jurisprudence in
the 1960s, the federal courts largely ceded the development of special assessment law to state
courts. See Robert C. Ellickson, Suburban Growth Controls: An Economic and Legal Analysis, 86
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after the Court’s 1968 decision in Avery v. Midland County.92 In Avery, the
Court held that local governments with “general governmental powers over
an entire geographic area” were required to apportion voting power in
accordance with the principle of “one person, one vote”93 articulated in the
landmark decision of Reynolds v. Sims.94 The Avery Court left open the
possibility that the “one person, one vote” rule might not apply to “a
special-purpose unit of government assigned the performance of functions
affecting definable groups of constituents more than other constituents.”95
Avery thus seemed to acknowledge that, contrary to Roberge and Eubank,
circumstances might exist in which it would be legitimate for government to
delegate power to individuals deemed disproportionately interested in the
subject matter of the government regulation.
The Supreme Court subsequently applied Avery’s exception in two cases,
Salyer Land Co. v. Tulare Lake Basin Water Storage District96 and Ball v.
James.97 In both cases, the Court evidently accepted the very public-choice
premise that Eubank and Roberge rejected, affirming that the state can
constitutionally confer regulatory power on presumptively self-interested
landowners in proportion to their presumed degree of interest.98 In Salyer
and Ball, plaintiffs challenged the voting structure of special-purpose
municipal districts.99 Special-purpose districts are similar to special assessment districts in that they are typically financed, at least in part, by assessments on benefitted landowners; they differ, however, in that specialpurpose districts are created directly by the state as autonomously functioning local governmental bodies rather than as subdivisions of a generalpurpose municipality.100 The entities in Salyer and Ball were water-storage
YALE L.J. 385, 472-73 (1977) (endorsing the Supreme Court’s implicit decision to leave special
assessments to the state courts).
92 390 U.S. 474 (1968).
93 Id. at 484-85.
94 See 377 U.S. 533, 568 (1964) (“We hold that, as a basic constitutional standard, the Equal
Protection Clause requires that the seats in both houses of a bicameral state legislature must be
apportioned on a population basis.”).
95 390 U.S. at 483-84.
96 410 U.S. 719 (1973).
97 451 U.S. 355 (1981).
98 See id. at 370-71 (citing Avery and concluding that the facts of the case “justif[y] a departure from the popular-election requirement of the Reynolds case”); Salyer, 410 U.S. at 728 (“We
conclude that the appellee water storage district, by reason [in part] . . . of the disproportionate
effect of its activities on landowners as a group, is the sort of exception to the rule . . . the
decision in Avery . . . contemplated.”).
99 Ball, 451 U.S. at 357; Salyer, 410 U.S. at 724-25.
100 See NANCY BURNS, THE FORMATION OF AMERICAN LOCAL GOVERNMENTS:
PRIVATE VALUES IN PUBLIC INSTITUTIONS 4, 14-15 (1994) (explaining that “[s]pecial districts
are independent local governments that generally perform only a few local government functions”
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districts that imposed mandatory assessments on landowners who received
water from the districts.101 Each parcel of land was assessed based on the
benefit it was deemed to receive, and voting rights for the directors of the
water districts were apportioned to landowners either according to their
parcels’ assessed valuations (in Salyer)102 or acreage (in Ball).103 The voting
schemes in the two cases were challenged for violating the “one person, one
vote” rule, but the Court held that Avery was inapplicable.104 In both cases,
the Court held that the water districts served only the limited purpose of
providing water and disproportionately impacted the landowners who paid
the assessments and whose land benefitted from receiving the water.105
In Ball, the Court reached this conclusion notwithstanding the fact that
the water district encompassed almost half of the population of Arizona,
including the Phoenix metropolitan region, and that it generated and sold
electric power as a means of generating additional revenue, thus making it a
significant player in the overall development of an arid region.106 Nevertheless, the Court found that the district did not “administer such normal
functions of government as the maintenance of streets, the operation of
schools, or sanitation, health, or welfare services.”107 Furthermore, the
Court held that the district’s weighted voting structure was legitimate
because there was a “disproportionately greater” relationship between the
district’s functions and the landowners empowered to vote within it.108
Weighting votes based on the acreage of land owned was reasonable “since
that number reasonably reflect[ed] the relative risks . . . landowners
[incurred] and the distribution of the benefits and the burdens of the
District’s water operations.”109
Salyer and Ball thus stand for the proposition that it is constitutionally
permissible, and indeed eminently reasonable, for government to delegate
regulatory power to landowners who have a disproportionate economic
interest in the subject matter of the regulation, at least when two predicates

in contrast to “general purpose local governments”); KATHRYN A. FOSTER, THE POLITICAL
ECONOMY OF SPECIAL-PURPOSE GOVERNMENT 7-15 (1997) (describing the different types of
special-purpose governments, their powers, and the legal bases for their creation).
101 Ball, 451 U.S. at 357, 359-60; Salyer, 410 U.S. at 721, 723-24.
102 410 U.S. at 725.
103 451 U.S. at 359.
104 See supra note 98.
105 Ball, 451 U.S. at 370; Salyer, 410 U.S. at 728.
106 451 U.S. at 365-66.
107 Id. at 366.
108 Id. at 371.
109 Id.
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are satisfied. First, the entity must serve a “special limited purpose”110
rather than a general governmental purpose; and second, it must disproportionately affect a distinct class of constituents.111 After Ball, it has been left
to state and lower federal courts to sort out the knotty analytical problem of
how exactly to distinguish “limited-purpose” from “general-purpose”
municipalities, and how to determine when one group of constituents is so
disproportionately affected by the operations of a governmental entity as to
justify departure from “one person, one vote.” A large body of doctrine has
therefore developed attempting to interpret and apply Salyer and Ball. For
purposes of this Article, two decisions are particularly relevant because they
apply the Salyer-Ball line to a traditional special assessment district and a
BID, respectively. In doing so, these decisions expressly use public-choice
reasoning to legitimize the regulatory mechanisms in question.
In Southern California Rapid Transit District v. Bolen, a California agency
created to finance and construct a rapid transit system in southern California
was empowered to recoup its costs by creating “special benefit assessment
districts” surrounding proposed rail stations.112 Landowners within the
assessment districts would pay a charge based on the amount of property
owned.113 The agency voted to create several benefit districts after determining that the landowners to be assessed would experience tangible
benefits, such as enhanced property values, from the introduction of rail
stations near their property.114 The law provided, however, that the creation
of a district be subject to a referendum of the affected landowners if “the
owners of at least 25 percent of the assessed value of real property within a
proposed district” requested it.115 Only landowners subject to the assessment were eligible to vote, and voting was weighted based upon the amount
of property owned.116 The court held that this voting scheme was constitutional under the Salyer-Ball line because it satisfied the two essential predicates for exemption from the “one person, one vote” rule. First, the special
assessment districts did not exercise any “general governmental powers” but
were “little more than formalistic, geographically defined perimeters whose
raison d’être is to serve as the conceptual medium for the recognition of
110
111

Salyer, 410 U.S. at 728.
Id. But see Richard Briffault, Who Rules at Home?: One Person/One Vote and Local Governments, 60 U. CHI. L. REV. 339, 370 (1993) (critiquing the Salyer-Ball predicates and arguing that
“[n]either criterion is analytically sound”).
112 822 P.2d 875, 877 (Cal. 1992) (in bank).
113 Id.
114 Id. at 878.
115 Id. at 877 (internal quotation marks omitted).
116 Id.

966

University of Pennsylvania Law Review

[Vol. 161: 939

economic benefits conferred and the imposition of a corresponding fiscal
burden.”117 Second, the assessment districts disproportionately affected the
enfranchised landowners because “it is they who will most directly feel both
the beneficial economic effects of the transit station locations and bear the
financial burden of the annual assessments.”118
Similarly, Kessler v. Grand Central District Management Ass’n assessed the
constitutionality of a BID established by the city of New York in the area
surrounding the historic Grand Central Terminal.119 Under city law, all
property owners within the territory of the Grand Central District Management Association (GCDMA) were required to pay annual assessments
to the GCDMA, which would use the funds to perform services within the
district such as maintenance, security, and street signage.120 The GCDMA’s
stated purpose was to promote business activity within the district for the
benefit of the assessed property owners.121 The president of the GCDMA
openly described himself as “a paid employee only of property owners.”122
The city law provided that voting for the GCDMA board of directors was
to be weighted based on property ownership. Specifically, the enabling
statute required that property owners elect a majority of the board.123 Citing
Salyer and Ball, the court found the GCDMA exempt from the “one person,
one vote” standard.124 The court held that the district had the limited
purpose of promoting business within the area, performed a narrow set of
functions, lacked regulatory authority, and was subject to substantial
governmental oversight.125 Furthermore, the GCDMA’s operation had a
substantially greater effect on the assessed property owners than others:
“The principal economic benefit from GCDMA’s activities . . . plainly
accrues to the property owners, who will enjoy an increase in the value of
their property.”126
Both Bolen and Kessler thus explicitly rely on capitalization theory as a
public-choice justification for the weighted voting structure of the district in
question. The fact that landowners stood to benefit economically from the
district’s activities legitimized their exercise of disproportionate political
117
118
119
120
121
122

Id. at 883.
Id. at 887.
158 F.3d 92, 93 (2d Cir. 1998).
Id. at 95-96.
Id. at 104.
Id. at 116 (Weinstein, J., dissenting) (quoting Douglas Feiden, Midtown Bonds Spark BID
Controversy, CRAIN’S N.Y. BUS., Apr. 6, 1992, at 1).
123 Id. at 97.
124 Id. at 99.
125 Id. at 104-07.
126 Id. at 108.

2013]

Neighborhood Empowerment

967

power, whereas in Roberge and Eubank, that same fact rendered the neighborhood zoning district unconstitutional.
C. Unifying the Doctrine?
Kessler and Bolen, like most decisions in the Salyer-Ball line, make no
mention of the parallel Eubank-Roberge line. Likewise, none of the cases in
the Eubank-Roberge line ever mentions the Salyer-Ball doctrine. Superficially,
the two lines of cases can be distinguished. In the Eubank-Roberge line, the
plaintiffs were enfranchised landowners within the district whose land was
subject to the district’s regulatory powers, whereas in the Salyer-Ball-Kessler
line, the plaintiffs were primarily nonlandowners in the area who were not
directly subject to the district’s regulatory authority but nevertheless sought
the franchise as a matter of equal protection, thus raising a “one person, one
vote” issue. As we recall, however, the public choice theory underlying both
special assessment and neighborhood zoning districts holds that the confinement of the franchise to landowners and the ability of a majority of
those landowners to coerce a recalcitrant minority are both mandated by the
“market failure” justification for state action. Government coercion is
necessary to protect property values in the face of a collective action
problem that makes market coordination impossible, and the limitation of
the franchise to landowners is necessary because the sole justification for
state intervention is to protect landowners’ property values.127
Thus, to the extent public choice theory supports the Kessler court’s decision that the franchise may be legitimately confined to landowners on the
grounds that landowners are disproportionately affected by the anticipated
increase in property values from the enhanced services of the GCDMA,128
public choice theory would also hold that a majority of block-front owners
in Roberge could legitimately prevent a neighboring landowner from siting a
group home on his property in order to overcome a collective action
problem that could result in the diminution of property values neighborhoodwide.129 Likewise, if the special assessment districts in Bolen were accurately
described as “little more than formalistic, geographically defined perimeters”
127
128
129

See supra notes 61-62 and accompanying text.
See Kessler, 158 F.3d at 108.
See supra notes 61-62 and accompanying text. It could be argued that, setting public choice
theory aside, courts should more strictly scrutinize instances of direct coercion (Roberge/Eubank)
than instances where plaintiffs merely claim to be affected in a noncoercive way by government
activity (Salyer/Ball/Kessler). I discuss this distinction in detail infra in Section III.B. and conclude
that it is not a sound basis for distinguishing the Eubank-Roberge line from the Salyer-Ball-Kessler
line.
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designed to serve as “conceptual medium[s]” for the recognition of a
distinct economic impact, the neighborhood zoning districts in Roberge and
Eubank would also fit that description.130
Finally, if the very purpose of state action under the public choice model
is to effectuate individual self-interest where the market proves inadequate
to do so, then it follows that the individuals empowered to act can of course
exercise their authority based on their own self-interest. The cases in the
Salyer-Ball line accept this logic insofar as they permit the franchise to be
confined to landowners with an economic interest in protecting property
values, whereas Eubank and Roberge reject this logic insofar as they refuse to
recognize economic interest as a legitimate basis for regulatory activity. In
short, where the Salyer-Ball line is consistent with the public choice model,
the Eubank-Roberge line is directly at odds with it.
On its face, then, there is an unresolved contradiction in the jurisprudence. And, as William James said, “whenever you meet a contradiction you
must make a distinction.”131 Unfortunately, the courts have never articulated
what that distinction may be, and law review commentators have done little
better. For example, George Liebmann has argued that neighborhoods
should be empowered to provide a wide range of services similar to those
typically provided by BIDs, such as law enforcement and the maintenance
of public facilities;132 likewise, Robert Ellickson has written glowingly of
BIDs, even advocating for the expansion of their use to residential urban
neighborhoods outside of downtown areas.133 Ellickson endorses the BID
because it enables landowners to circumvent the inefficient “rent-seeking”
of big city government and directly provide themselves with desired local
amenities.134 He further argues that restricting the franchise to landowners
is sensible because, given the capitalization literature, landowners are clearly
disproportionately affected by the introduction of new local improvements.135 This very logic, of course, would also support neighborhood
130 S. Cal. Rapid Transit Dist. v. Bolen, 822 P.2d 875, 883 (Cal. 1992) (in bank). Thus, the
distinction between “general-purpose” and “special-purpose” governmental entities provides little
help in distinguishing neighborhood zoning districts from special assessment districts. For a more
detailed discussion of the distinction between general-purpose and special-purpose districts, see
infra text accompanying notes 142-55.
131 WILLIAM JAMES, PRAGMATISM & OTHER WRITINGS 24 (Giles B. Gunn ed., Penguin
Books 2000) (1907).
132 See Liebmann, supra note 12, at 351-64 (listing and describing services he would authorize
neighborhood organizations to provide).
133 See Ellickson, supra note 2, at 82-85 (describing the advantages of block improvement
districts (BLIDs), including their small scale and tight-knit social networks).
134 Id. at 89-90.
135 Id. at 92-95.
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zoning control. However, both Ellickson and Liebmann recoil at the
prospect of conferring more than token zoning powers on neighborhood
groups.136 Neither scholar provides more than a cursory explanation of how
they can meaningfully distinguish neighborhood zoning districts from
BIDs.137 Robert Nelson, the rare scholar who has actually advocated for
neighborhood zoning control, has simply ignored the Roberge line entirely.138
In the following Part, I look beneath the surface of both the doctrine
and the commentary in an attempt to discern whether there is a meaningful
distinction between neighborhood zoning districts and special assessment
districts that may explain the contradiction. Ultimately, I conclude that
there is no sound way to distinguish these devices. Indeed, if there is any
valid distinction, it is that neighborhood control of zoning is far less troublesome as a matter of public policy than the special assessment district.
III. PUBLIC POLICY AND NEIGHBORHOOD EMPOWERMENT
A. The Risk of Majoritarian Exploitation
Whenever power is delegated from a higher to a lower level of government, it raises a concern, expressed most famously in James Madison’s
Federalist No. 10, that a locally dominant faction may exploit a vulnerable
minority.139 In their innovative article Land Assembly Districts, Michael
Heller and Rick Hills use Madison’s framework to argue that both neighborhood zoning districts and BIDs present a risk of majoritarian exploitation.140
They further contend that Madison’s argument in Federalist No. 10 can help
explain both the Roberge and the Salyer-Ball lines of cases.141 Thus, this
136 See id. at 99 (proposing a statute that would give an “ordinary BLID” some authority to
waive zoning restrictions but otherwise deny regulatory powers); Liebmann, supra note 12, at 346,
362 (concluding that several “external effects” create a “strong case” for not giving zoning powers
to community associations).
137 See infra notes 266-68 and accompanying text.
138 See NELSON, supra note 12, at 404-08 (discussing the Avery line as potentially applicable
precedent but declining to mention the Roberge line).
139 See THE FEDERALIST No. 10, at 78 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 2003)
(developing a theory explaining why smaller societies are more likely to engender oppressive
majorities).
140 See Heller & Hills, supra note 37, at 1500-03 (discussing how the multiple functions performed by BIDs increase the number of opportunities to exploit minority groups); see also id. at
1521 (arguing that authorizing neighborhoods to control their own zoning would raise a strong
possibility of “intra-group exploitation”). Richard Briffault also acknowledges that BIDs raise “the
classic Madisonian possibility of tyranny by a majority faction.” Briffault, supra note 6, at 457.
141 See Heller & Hills, supra note 37, at 1499 & n.83 (“Because of this worry about ‘parochial’
and ‘selfish’ behavior, courts have limited the power of neighborhoods to impose new zoning
restrictions on parcels . . . .” (citing Eubank and Roberge, among others)).
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Section considers whether the problem of majoritarian exploitation can shed
any light on the judicial distinction between neighborhood zoning districts
and special assessment districts. I conclude that special assessment districts
are likely to be more susceptible to majoritarian exploitation than neighborhood zoning districts, and are thus more deserving of close judicial scrutiny.
1. The Federalist No. 10 and Neighborhood Homogeneity
As Heller and Hills recapitulate Madison’s argument, a large and diverse polity such as a big city is likely to feature a wide variety of pressure
groups that forge shifting governing coalitions through logrolling (i.e.,
trading votes with other pressure groups). This political dynamic enables
each group to exert some influence, but none to dominate.142 As the size of
the polity shrinks, however, the number of interest groups also shrinks,
thereby making vote-trading difficult and permitting a stable majority to
consistently impose its views on a more vulnerable minority.143 This
problem may be avoided, however, if the boundaries of the polity are drawn
narrowly to ensure that the population has fairly uniform interests. Indeed,
the public-choice view of local government holds that a homogeneous
governing entity is more efficient than a heterogeneous one because it can
directly effect the unanimous will of the public without the inefficiencies of
vote-trading, such as conflict, bureaucracy, pork-barrel spending, and
redistribution.144
This Madisonian/public-choice perspective proves helpful for the present
analysis because it is consistent with both the Roberge line and the SalyerBall line. As Heller and Hills note, the Roberge and Eubank decisions
express a Madisonian apprehension that a dominant group of landowners
within a small polity may selfishly exploit a minority to further its own
parochial interests.145 Likewise, the distinction drawn in the Salyer-Ball
cases between a general-purpose governmental entity that broadly affects
142 See id. at 1499 (explaining how the size of a community affects political dynamics within
that community and leads to “vote-trading”).
143 Id.
144 See, e.g., NELSON, supra note 12, at 392-94 (asserting that homogeneity fosters efficiency
whereas heterogeneity fosters conflict and redistribution); Michelman, supra note 61, at 194
(“There is a good economic argument to the effect that the efficiency of a majoritarian fiscal
regime is maximized when homogeneity of preferences among the citizenry is also maximized . . . .”); see also Merrill, supra note 56, at 298 (positing that delegating power to a group with
uniform interests, such as a neighborhood, ensures that the delegation will have “little distributional impact within the neighborhood”).
145 See Heller & Hills, supra note 37, at 1499 (“[T]he courts fear that a majority of neighbors
will unite around the goal of restricting a nearby parcel’s uses and thereby enhance the value of the
neighbors’ own land at the burdened parcel owner’s expense.”).
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the public at large and a special-purpose entity that performs a narrow
function disproportionately affecting certain constituents may reflect a
similar public-choice logic. If a small governing entity performs a wide
range of functions that implicates a divergence of interests, it is likely to
cleave into opposing factions and, absent the possibility of vote-trading in a
larger and more diverse entity, a stable majority faction may emerge. An
entity that performs only a narrow function over which strong disagreement
is unlikely, by contrast, does not present a similar threat that dueling
factions will emerge. As such, the Salyer-Ball line subjects the former sort of
entity—the small, heterogeneous entity with broad powers—to a stricter
constitutional standard.146 Accordingly, Heller and Hills conclude that to
the extent a governmental entity is able to homogenize interests within the
jurisdiction so as to minimize the risk of majoritarian exploitation, the more
likely it is to survive scrutiny under both the Roberge and the Salyer-Ball
doctrines.147
a. The Neighborhood Zoning District
Let us consider both the neighborhood zoning district and the special
assessment district under this framework. Beginning with the former, Heller
and Hills claim that neighborhood zoning districts are problematic because
the opportunities for intra-group exploitation are high in a neighborhood
composed of different-sized structures serving different functions. The
possibility that residential owners would burden commercial structures with
onerous restrictions is matched only by the possibility that commercial
owners would burden residential owners with noxious uses. Even among
residential owners, the owners of large and small buildings would have
persistently different interests that would invite intra-neighborhood
squabbling.148

Heller and Hills direct this criticism specifically at the scheme proposed by
Robert Nelson. Nelson’s scheme, we recall, would enable a group of landowners within a neighborhood to petition for the creation of a neighborhood association, which would then exercise a full complement of zoning
powers on an ongoing basis over the entire neighborhood.149 As I address
146 See id. at 1503-04 (noting the exception to the general “one person, one vote” rule for
“special districts that are authorized to pursue only narrowly defined goals”).
147 See id. at 1500-05 (arguing that the Land Assembly districts are immune from the problems of Madisonian exploitation because they are homogeneous and have limited powers).
148 Id. at 1521.
149 See supra notes 39-41 and accompanying text.

972

University of Pennsylvania Law Review

[Vol. 161: 939

further below, Heller and Hills’s critique of Nelson’s scheme has some
validity; however, it is totally inapplicable to the neighborhood-consent
schemes involved in the Roberge trio for three reasons.
First, Heller and Hills concede that the intra-group exploitation concern
is mitigated wherever neighborhood control is limited to a “one-shot deal”
in which the neighborhood is “not responsible for the ongoing management
of different land uses.”150 The one-shot deal, while making vote-trading
impossible, will also necessarily limit the ability of a dominant faction to
exploit a minority. As it turns out, the neighborhood-consent schemes
involved in the Eubank-Cusack-Roberge cases were all one-shot deals—
landowners were given a one-time power to vote on a proposed land use
change within a designated proximity to their property.
Second, the districts at issue in those three cases all had a fairly limited
purpose. They did not have general zoning powers, but had jurisdiction
only to resolve one discrete issue—to set building lines in Eubank, to
authorize the construction of a billboard in Cusack, and to site a group home
in Roberge.151 This limited authority likewise would reduce opportunities for
conflict among landowners.
Third and finally, Heller and Hills’s critique presumes a neighborhood
that is relatively diverse in terms of land uses—a mix of commercial and
residential uses or, at least, a mix of large and small residential buildings.152
In Roberge, however, the power to approve a group home was delegated only
to landowners in districts zoned for single-family homes.153 Given the
capitalization literature and homeowners’ well-documented concern with
property values, it is at least plausible that single-family homeowners would
have generally uniform interests in excluding group homes. Thus, the
neighborhood-consent scheme at issue in Roberge is seemingly one that
public choice theorists would heartily endorse.
b. The Special Assessment District
Ironically, under the criteria just considered, all of the special assessment schemes that we have reviewed—and that the courts have upheld—
would be problematic. The special-purpose districts in Salyer, Ball, and
Kessler were not one-shot deals, but entities with ongoing governmental
powers.154 The BID in Kessler performed a wide range of functions such as
150
151
152
153
154

Heller & Hills, supra note 37, at 1521.
See supra Section II.A.
See supra note 148 and accompanying text.
Washington ex rel. Seattle Title Trust Co. v. Roberge, 278 U.S. 116, 117-18 (1928).
See supra Section II.B.

2013]

Neighborhood Empowerment

973

sanitation, security, and lobbying city government, not the relatively
limited set of functions involved in the Roberge trio.155 Finally, the districts
at issue in Ball,156 Kessler,157 and Bolen158 all operated in highly diverse
metropolitan areas with a variety of land uses and demographics while
limiting the franchise to a small subset of that diverse population.
This combination of factors makes intra-group conflict and exploitation
in a small governing entity almost unavoidable. This is especially true for
BIDs because the basic function of the BID is to manage public spaces, such
as urban downtown areas, that are regularly used by a wide variety of
individuals with diverse expectations regarding those spaces’ appropriate
use.159 I single out the BID here briefly because it is perhaps the most
widely used and controversial device cities have employed in recent years to
devolve power upon neighborhood groups.160 For BIDs, exploitation can
occur along at least three axes: among property owners; between property
owners and tenants; and between property owners and other users of the
space, such as street entertainers, vendors, or the homeless.
i. Conflict Among Landowners in the BID
First, where there is a diversity of land uses, disagreement among landowners is likely to occur, even as early as the formation of the BID. The
owners of large office buildings may feel that the BID is superfluous if they
are “already . . . providing the supplemental sanitation and security
services that the BID would offer,”161 while small business owners may see
the mandatory assessments as an unwanted expense on top of already
burdensome property taxes.162 Industrial landowners, who have little
concern about making the area attractive for consumers, may not want to
pay for services intended to beautify the neighborhood, while residential
landowners “may be unable to pass on the BID’s costs to tenants or

155 See Briffault, supra note 6, at 432-39 (arguing that the GCDMA in Kessler was not a
“limited-purpose” entity in the sense meant by Salyer and Ball because it discharged far too many
functions).
156 See supra notes 101 & 103 and accompanying text.
157 See supra notes 101-02 and accompanying text.
158 See supra notes 112-16 and accompanying text.
159 See Briffault, supra note 6, at 416, 429 (noting that BIDs tend to operate in older, developed commercial areas that are open to the public).
160 See id. at 366-67; see also Frug, supra note 14, at 17 (“[T]here seems to be an almost automatic answer when one seeks to create an organization to improve neighborhood life: Let’s create
a BID.”).
161 Briffault, supra note 6, at 384.
162 See id. at 384-85.
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customers.”163 Once the BID is in operation, disagreements may arise over
its philosophy and priorities. For example, as Richard Briffault notes, there
may be tensions between owners of mainstream businesses who seek a
clean-cut, tourist-friendly image for the district, and owners of bars,
nightclubs, or adult entertainment establishments, who desire to cultivate a
more free-wheeling environment.164 BIDs may even lobby city hall for
zoning changes that would make presently existing uses, such as adult
entertainment establishments, unlawful within the district.165 Heller and
Hills conclude, accordingly, that the diverse interests of landowners within
BIDs “make for contentious neighborhood politics and result in poor
governance.”166 They are not entities of which Madison or the public-choice
theorists would be proud.167
ii. Conflict Between Landowners and Tenants in the BID
BIDs also create potential tensions between landowners as a class and
the tenants who are typically disenfranchised. Tenants can be dramatically
affected by the operation of a BID, often in very different ways from
landowners.168 Because the raison d’être of the BID is to raise property
values for the benefit of property owners, an attendant result may be
dramatic rent increases for tenants as well as a general gentrification of the
area. Higher rents can lead, in turn, to the displacement of “stores that
serve poor and working class customers” by “more upscale shops.”169
Tenants who are not forced out by higher rents will nevertheless have
163
164

Id. at 385.
See id. at 416 (“BID expenditures to cultivate a distinctive image may be in tension with
the interests of particular landowners or businesses whose activities do not fit the image.”).
165 See MICHAEL WARNER, THE TROUBLE WITH NORMAL 161 (1999) (discussing the
Times Square BID’s efforts to rezone the area to prohibit adult businesses).
166 Heller & Hills, supra note 37, at 1500.
167 See Briffault, supra note 6, at 457 (showing how BID governance presents the “classic
Madisonian possibility of tyranny by a majority faction”). The critique in this subsection would
not apply specifically to the Salyer-Ball-Kessler line because those cases involved challenges brought
by nonlandowners. However, as discussed infra note 240, the vast majority of litigation involving
BIDs has been brought by landowners complaining about being subject to the mandatory assessment.
168 Id. at 436 (“BID assessments . . . affect both property owners and nonowners. . . . BID
policing strategies, social service programs, street maintenance and repairs and economic
development activities can have a direct impact on district residents and on the quality of life in
the district.”); see also Richard C. Schragger, The Limits of Localism, 100 MICH. L. REV. 371, 448
(2001) (“Certainly the BID’s construction of sidewalks and other public accommodations and its
provision of private security forces, social outreach services, and sanitation services altered the
daily lives of the people who lived there, arguably more so than the daily lives of the oftenabsentee property owners.”).
169 Briffault, supra note 6, at 474-75.
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different priorities with regard to the expenditure of BID funds than their
landlords will. For instance, while business owners may want to deploy a
maximum number of security personnel during the daytime when tourists
flock downtown, residential tenants may prefer more security during the
evenings, when they return home from work.170
iii. Conflict Between Landowners and Users in the BID
Finally, BIDs’ efforts to improve urban neighborhoods often have impacts
on users of the space who many landowners may regard as unwelcome.
Street entertainers and food trucks, for example, threaten both to compete
with downtown businesses for customers and to detract from the carefully
constructed, tourist-friendly environment that BIDs set out to create.171 As
to the homeless, there is an inherent tension between their needs to use
public spaces for the performance of essential life functions and the BIDs’
mission to make public spaces attractive for customers.172 Several BIDs have
been accused of using strong-arm tactics to harass the homeless and force
them to leave the area.173 While many of these allegations have turned out
to be unfounded,174 and there are those who believe that BIDs have provided
many positive services for the homeless,175 the core interests of the BID and

170 See Daniel R. Garodnick, Comment, What’s the BID Deal? Can the Grand Central Business
Improvement District Serve a Special Limited Purpose?, 148 U. PA. L. REV. 1733, 1765-67 (2000)
(discussing a hypothetical situation in which private security employed by a BID creates greater
costs for residents than benefits because the private security is deployed during the day when
residents are unable to enjoy it).
171 BIDs have led a recent effort to crack down on food trucks in the city of Los Angeles,
claiming that food trucks are free riders on the services provided by BIDs. See Report on
Regulation of Mobile Food Trucks from Gerry Miller, Chief Legislative Analyst, L.A. City
Council, to the L.A. City Council 1-2 (Feb. 17, 2011) (suggesting a municipal ordinance that would
strengthen regulation of food trucks, and discussing BIDs’ reasons for desiring additional
regulation). My thanks to Ernesto Hernandez for drawing my attention to the Los Angeles food
truck controversy and this document in particular.
172 See Nicholas Blomley, Introduction to Section I: Public Space, THE LEGAL GEOGRAPHIES
READER 3, 3-4 (Nicholas Blomley et al. eds., 2001).
173 See Kessler v. Grand Cent. Dist. Mgmt. Ass’n, 158 F.3d 92, 122 (2d Cir. 1998) (Weinstein,
J., dissenting) (citing instances in which BID “goon squads” were alleged to have harassed
homeless individuals); Briffault, supra note 6, at 402-03 (discussing efforts by BIDs in Portland,
Baltimore, and Philadelphia to deal with the homeless population including morning “wake-up
calls” for persons sleeping on the street).
174 See Briffault, supra note 6, at 402 (noting that an independent investigation by a “leading
advocate for the homeless” found no evidence supporting allegations that the Grand Central BID
used physical violence against the homeless).
175 See, e.g., id. at 404 (quoting the same advocate’s statement that BIDs provide “vitally
important” services for the homeless).
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those of the homeless are, at best, difficult to reconcile.176 Since landowners
have most of the voting power in the BID and the homeless have none, the
prospects for intra-group exploitation are strong.
iv. Other Special Assessment Districts
While BIDs present the Madisonian problem of majority exploitation
rather starkly, the problem is also present on a smaller scale in the governance of special-purpose districts and single-shot special assessment districts,
such as the one involved in Bolen.177 Special-purpose districts, even if
limited to such issues as water storage, may affect landowners in rather
different ways. As the dissent in Salyer noted, water districts may create
flooding risks that impact landowners adjacent to navigable waterways far
more than others.178 With regard to a case like Bolen, the introduction of an
improvement such as a rail station into a diverse urban neighborhood may
give rise to conflict between landowners with divergent interests. For
example, while owners of residential or commercial property might favor a
new rail station, owners of industrial property might worry that a new
station would increase residential use in the area, perhaps leading to
nuisance lawsuits or rezoning requests by new residents. A new rail station
could also dramatically affect tenants, who would be forced to endure higher
rents (as property values rise), increased noise and foot traffic, and changes
to the character of the community.179

176 See id. at 403 (noting the “tension inherent in BID programs that seek to combine the
traditional social service goals of homeless outreach with the security and business development
goal of homeless removal”).
177 See S. Cal. Rapid Transit Dist. v. Bolen, 822 P.2d 875, 877 (Cal. 1992) (in bank) (describing a one-shot special assessment district in which commercial land owners, but not residential
landowners, could veto a special assessment to finance a metro rail station).
178 See Salyer Land Co. v. Tulare Lake Basin Water Storage Dist., 410 U.S. 719, 737-38 (1973)
(Douglas, J., dissenting) (comparing the divergent interests of an absentee corporate landowner
who tabled a motion to divert flooding in order to advance his own financial interests with the
interests of a residential landowner with less political power in the district whose land was flooded
as a result).
179 The appeals court in Bolen made exactly this point and found the special assessment
scheme invalid under City of Phoenix v. Kolodziejski, 399 U.S. 204 (1970). See S. Cal. Rapid Transit
Dist. v. Bolen, 269 Cal. Rptr. 147, 156-57 (Ct. App. 1990) (finding that commercial tenants will
bear much of the financial burden “by virtue of ‘pass-through’ clauses in their leases”), rev’d, 822
P.2d 875; id. at 156 (“Because a special assessment will not finance the entire cost of a rapid transit
system, part of the financing burden is likely to fall on nonlandowning persons inside the
assessment district in the form of general property taxes, sales taxes and similar measures.”
(quoting David J. Hayes, Note, Rapid Transit Financing: Use of the Special Assessment, 29 STAN. L.
REV. 795, 809-10 (1977))).
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v. Comparing the Neighborhood Zoning District
and the Special Assessment District
In many cases, then, the neighborhood zoning district will present a
lesser risk of intra-group exploitation than will the special assessment
district. This is evidenced by the fact that virtually all of the legal challenges
brought against neighborhood zoning districts have been initiated by
landowners within the district,180 whereas special assessment districts and
BIDs have been beset by litigation from both landowners complaining
about their assessments181 and nonlandowners complaining about being
disenfranchised.182 This pattern strongly suggests that the BID and special
assessment district affect a more heterogeneous array of interests than the
neighborhood zoning district, and thus present a heightened risk of majoritarian exploitation.
This contrast should not be too sharply drawn, however. To the extent
that special assessment districts or BIDs operate in more homogeneous
neighborhoods, the risk of majoritarian exploitation may be limited. For
instance, a modern trend, much hailed by Ellickson and Liebmann,183 is for
the BID concept to be extended outside the downtown area to residential
neighborhoods.184 If such neighborhoods are relatively uniform in character,
residents may have fairly consistent interests in bringing in desirable
amenities that will increase property values. Outsiders, including peddlers,
entertainers, the homeless, and others, arguably have a weaker interest in
accessing and exercising control over the character of these residential areas
than they do over downtown areas that are also important public spaces. By
the same token, neighborhood zoning districts may present a serious risk of
exploitation if, as in Nelson’s scheme,185 a fairly heterogeneous group of
urban landowners is given ongoing control over a wide range of zoning
functions within the neighborhood. As Heller and Hills note, commercial,
industrial, and residential landowners may be at odds over what sorts of
uses are permissible.186 In addition, tenants may oppose the introduction of
180
181
182
183
184
185

See cases cited supra notes 86 & 87.
See cases cited infra note 240 and accompanying text.
Salyer, Ball, Kessler, and Bolen would all fall into this category.
See supra notes 132-33.
See supra note 50.
See NELSON, supra note 12, at 259-314 (proposing that state governments create new
private neighborhood associations empowered to regulate zoning with less than unanimous
consent).
186 See Heller & Hills, supra note 37, at 1521 (“The possibility that residential owners would
burden commercial structures with onerous restrictions is matched only by the possibility that
commercial owners would burden residential owners with noxious uses.”).
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land uses that threaten to diminish their quality of life while enriching their
landlords; conversely, they may favor the introduction of land uses that bring
down their rents, which landlords would oppose for the same reason.187
The salient point here, however, is that the Madisonian concern about
majoritarian exploitation provides no basis for distinguishing neighborhood
zoning districts per se from special assessment districts. We cannot simply
assume that neighborhood zoning districts are more likely to result in
majoritarian exploitation than special assessment districts. Rather, either
device may or may not present this problem, depending on how we answer
the following questions: Is the district a one-shot deal or an ongoing
enterprise? Is the district generally homogeneous or heterogeneous in land
uses and demographics? Does the district serve a limited function over
which intra-group disagreement is unlikely, or does it perform functions
that are likely to breed disagreement among stakeholders? These questions
can be answered only ad hoc based on the circumstances of each particular
delegation, rather than by categorically distinguishing neighborhood zoning
districts from special assessment districts.
2. Preventing Majoritarian Exploitation Through Logrolling
In addition to the foregoing, there is another ad hoc inquiry that is
relevant in assessing the risk of majoritarian exploitation under the
Madisonian/public-choice normative conception of local government. This
inquiry will again demonstrate that there is often greater cause for concern
about the accountability of special assessment districts than neighborhood
zoning districts.
For Heller and Hills, the problem with delegating power to the neighborhood level is that shrinking the size of the polity and truncating the number
of pressure groups makes vote-trading impossible and thereby enables a
dominant faction to emerge.188 This Madisonian problem can be alleviated,
we have seen, if the polity in question is sufficiently homogeneous that all
stakeholders share relatively uniform interests.189 The problem can also be
alleviated, however, in precisely the opposite direction: by increasing the size
and heterogeneity of the polity. In short, even if a particular group is
187 For a similar critique, see, for example, M. Paige Ammons, Book Note, Private Governance for All: A Desirable Outcome or a Cause for Concern?, 9 NYU J. LEGIS. & PUB. POL’Y 503, 51215 (2005) (reviewing NELSON, supra note 12) (criticizing Nelson’s proposal on the grounds that
low-income communities would be susceptible to invasion of LULUs that could diminish quality
of life or, conversely, gentrification that could force them to exit the neighborhood).
188 See supra notes 142-43 and accompanying text.
189 See supra note 144 and accompanying text.
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vulnerable to exploitation by a dominant faction at the neighborhood level,
this is no cause for concern if the neighborhood group is subject to oversight by an entity that is sufficiently large and diverse to permit the locally
disadvantaged group to seek effective relief through logrolling.190 Indeed, a
scheme of decentralization to local groups under the loose oversight of a
larger, more diverse authority is just the sort of federalist structure that
Madison envisioned.
In an incisive analysis of the Eubank-Cusack-Roberge trilogy, Frank
Michelman asserts that the divergent results in those cases may be explained
in precisely this fashion. According to Michelman, the Court’s rulings in
the three cases rests implicitly on the principle that the judiciary should
defer to a delegation of power where the party presumptively disabled by
the delegation had a fair chance of dissuading the larger delegating authority
from devolving the power in the first instance. For Michelman, this implicit
test reflects a
Madisonian or Dahlian vision of coalitions that form and re-form from
issue to issue, of legislators exchanging support here for support there in an
ever-shifting alignment of interest groups, making plausible an expectation
that over the long run everyone would enjoy a net balance of political gains
in excess of losses.191

According to Michelman, the Court may have upheld the delegation in
Cusack (requiring neighbor consent to site a billboard within certain precincts) on the implicit grounds that the billboard industry, whose interests
were adversely affected by the delegation, was “almost certainly a selfconscious and very possibly a formally organized interest-group” and
therefore “would have had a fair chance to fight their battle, to protect their
interest, to engage effectively in political horsetrade, at the city council
level.”192 By contrast, the interests harmed in Eubank (which gave blockfront owners the power to establish setback lines) had “no comparable logrolling opportunity” for “it is hard to imagine an anti-setback lobby.”193
Likewise, sponsors of group homes for the elderly or young children (the land
use subjected to neighborhood referenda in Roberge) “may seem less certain
to have been an organized or organizeable interest group capable of effective

190 See Michelman, supra note 61, at 172-74 (describing how logrolling can protect the interests
of minorities in a majoritarian scheme).
191 Id. at 173.
192 Id. at 172.
193 Id.
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lobbying at the city-council level.”194 Thus, the delegation in Cusack survived scrutiny whereas the delegations in Eubank and Roberge did not.
Michelman’s analysis proves useful in analyzing the Salyer-Ball line as
well. The water districts in both Salyer and Ball were ultimately subject to
control by the state, and the Ball Court noted that the plaintiffs disenfranchised by the Salt River District were still qualified voters in the state of
Arizona.195 As such, they retained the ability to influence their legislators,
“who created and have the power to change the district.”196 In Kessler, the
court likewise stressed that the City of New York exercised substantial
supervisory authority over the GCDMA.197
These cases, however, look only to the theoretical availability of oversight and do not examine whether parties disadvantaged by legislation
actually had a meaningful opportunity to influence a higher-level authority
and defend their interests. Michelman’s analysis requires a clear-eyed
assessment of the lobbying power of the group disadvantaged by the
delegation of power. As a corollary to Michelman’s analysis, we should also
assess the relative lobbying power of the group or groups that benefit from
the delegation of power. A close examination of this question reveals that,
in many circumstances, opponents of neighborhood zoning districts will
have a far better opportunity to influence the legislative body than opponents of special assessment districts and BIDs. As such, courts should defer
more readily to the former than the latter.
a. The Neighborhood Zoning District
To begin with neighborhood control of zoning, Michelman’s analysis of
the Roberge trio correctly suggests that the relative lobbying power of
interested groups will often be a highly fact-sensitive inquiry. Nevertheless,
we can make some general observations. On one hand, those who advocate
for the siting of a locally undesirable land use (LULU) in a particular
neighborhood often face an unfavorable political environment because of
opposition from neighbors who live near the proposed site,198 often derisively

194
195
196
197

Id. at 174 n.93.
Ball v. James, 451 U.S. 355, 371 n.20 (1981).
Id.
See Kessler v. Grand Cent. Dist. Mgmt. Ass’n, 158 F.3d 92, 106 (2d Cir. 1998) (“[E]ven
the activities that GCDMA performs are subject to close City control.”).
198 See, e.g., Vicki Been, Compensated Siting Proposals: Is It Time to Pay Attention?, 21 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 787, 788-90 (1994) (“The siting of LULUs . . . has become an extraordinarily
difficult public policy challenge.”).
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referred to as NIMBYs (“Not In My Backyard”).199 Because NIMBY
groups tend to be relatively small, geographically concentrated, and intensely
interested in keeping LULUs out of their neighborhoods, they can readily
organize into an effective lobbying force. By contrast, those members of the
general public who favor a LULU siting will usually comprise a larger and
more geographically dispersed group, and individual members of the group
will typically be far less interested in the particular location of a LULU than
will its potential neighbors.200
On the other hand, neighborhood groups are not always successful in
influencing city hall. As it turns out, many LULUs have at least one very
powerful, well-organized interest group in their corner: developers. LULUs
such as billboards, gas stations, and nightclubs can of course be very profitable, so developers have strong incentives to ensure that zoning laws
liberally permit such uses. Furthermore, developers often have a number of
advantages over the homeowners’ groups that oppose them. Developers
tend to be “repeat players” at city hall,201 which enables them to cultivate
relationships with city officials and learn the often esoteric workings of city
government.202 Development professionals maintain a variety of professional
organizations, such as the Urban Land Institute,203 through which they can
aggregate knowledge and resources to more effectively lobby legislatures.
199 See Fischel, NIMBYs, supra note 25, at 144-45 (defining the term NIMBY, and explaining
that opposing nearby development may be a rational reaction to uninsurable threats to homeowners’
largest financial asset, to wit, the home).
200 See MICHAEL O’HARE ET AL., FACILITY SITING AND PUBLIC OPPOSITION 70-71
(1983) (“People who think a new facility will leave them much worse off than they would be
without it are strongly induced to take action against it; people who each have a little bit to gain
from its completion are only weakly motivated to support it. When the losers are few in number
and known to each other, they also have the ability to act, while a large number of beneficiaries
cannot easily organize themselves to take action.”); Been, supra note 198, at 789-90 (noting that
one explanation for siting problems is that “the benefits of LULUs are spread diffusely over an
entire community . . . while their costs are concentrated upon the host neighborhood” (footnote
omitted)); see also MANCUR OLSON, THE LOGIC OF COLLECTIVE ACTION 52 (3d prtg. 1973)
(postulating that “[s]mall groups will further their common interests better than large groups”);
Daniel A. Farber, Public Choice and Just Compensation, 9 CONST. COMMENT. 279, 289 (1992) (“If
public choice has any one key finding, it is that small groups with high stakes have a disproportionately great influence on the political process.”).
201 See ELLICKSON & BEEN , supra note 5, at 306 (“[R]eal estate interests tend to be repeat
players before the commissions and legislative bodies; accordingly, they may develop personal
relationships with members that may compromise the appointed or elected officials’ ability to
assess the worth of a particular proposal.”).
202 See, e.g., JOHN R. LOGAN & HARVEY L. MOLOTCH, URBAN FORTUNES: THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF PLACE 62 (1987) (“Business people’s continuous interaction with public
officials . . . gives them systemic power.” (citation omitted)).
203 See About ULI, URBAN LAND INSTITUTE, http://www.uli.org/about-uli (last visited Jan.
28, 2013).
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The development industry is also supported by a matrix of ancillary interests who profit from development, including the media, the transportation
industry, construction unions, and financiers.204 Finally, developers often
have considerable financial resources that they can use to make political
campaign contributions and lobby for favorable legislation.205
Homeowners, by contrast, have few of these organizing advantages. Far
from being repeat players in the land use process, they are typically indifferent toward local government until someone proposes to site a controversial development in their backyard.206 Once that particular controversy
passes, homeowners revert to their former, more passive state as a “sack of
potatoes.”207 As such, homeowners generally do not form ongoing relationships with city officials, do not have insider knowledge of the land use entitlement process, do not create professional organizations devoted to advancing
homeowner interests (although they may create issue-specific groups like
“Stop the ____ development”), and do not systematically contribute to
political campaigns to advance their interests. In addition, there are no
ancillary interest groups who profit from preventing growth and who may
therefore be counted on to lobby on behalf of neighborhood groups. And, of
course, most homeowners do not possess the financial resources that
developers have to influence legislatures.

204 See LOGAN & MOLOTCH, supra note 202, at 62-85 (describing in detail the various parts
of the development or “growth machine” in the United States, which involves a diverse range of
players including politicians, media outlets, utility companies, universities, and recreational
establishments).
205 See id. at 230-32 (discussing the importance of campaign contributions from developers in
local elections which enables the election of “politicians sympathetic to development”); Ellickson,
supra note 91, at 407-08 (“With the possible exception of municipal labor unions, landdevelopment interests appear to be the largest investors in municipal politics in the United
States.”).
206 See, e.g., LOGAN & MOLOTCH, supra note 202, at 134 (noting that “urban residents are
“naturally disorganized,” whereas business elites are “naturally organized”); Norman I. Fainstein
& Susan S. Fainstein, Regime Strategies, Communal Resistance, and Economic Forces (describing
neighborhood groups as “[v]ulnerable to cooptation, highly disaggregated, leadership-dominated
and episodic in intensity,” and concluding that “they will never be the formulators of state policy
but can only react to it”), in SUSAN S. FAINSTEIN ET AL., RESTRUCTURING THE CITY: THE
POLITICAL ECONOMY OF URBAN REDEVELOPMENT 245, 274 (1983); Tracy M. Gordon,
Bargaining in the Shadow of the Ballot Box: Causes and Consequences of Local Voter Initiatives, 141 PUB.
CHOICE 31, 33-34 (2009) (describing the free rider challenges that homeowners may face in
organizing to influence city government).
207 See MIKE DAVIS, CITY OF QUARTZ: E XCAVATING THE FUTURE IN L OS ANGELES
209-10 (1990) (noting Marx’s depiction of the French peasantry as “a sack of potatoes” and arguing
that homeowners who oppose growth are “basically peasant potatoes whose ‘natural’ scale of
protest is disaggregated nimbyism”).
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Perhaps most importantly, city governments are predisposed to look
favorably upon new development that promises to contribute to municipal
tax bases depleted by interlocal competition, diminished government
subsidies, urban disinvestment, and tax revolts.208 Many cities are in a
seemingly constant state of fiscal crisis that requires them to approve new
development to compensate for a diminished tax base.209 This fiscal pressure
gives developers yet another advantage in the fight for influence at city hall.
How can we reconcile the evidence that homeowners have near veto
power over the siting of LULUs with the evidence that developers truly
hold the reins of municipal politics? In truth, many factors determine the
relative strength that neighborhood groups possess in local politics vis-à-vis
developers. Two important factors are the size and heterogeneity of the
municipality in question. As William Fischel argues, in small suburban
communities where homeowners comprise the vast majority of the voting
population, developers may well be reduced to “supplicants.”210 In larger,
more heterogeneous cities, however, homeowners are only one of many
interest groups, and developers’ organizational advantages may give them
the edge.211
Another important factor, hinted at in Michelman’s analysis, is whether
the LULU in question offers a net contribution to or a net drain on the local
tax base. Tax-generating uses, such as nightclubs, shopping centers, or waste
facilities, will likely enjoy a more favorable reception at city hall than taxdraining uses such as low-income housing or group homes.212 The empirical

208 See, e.g., Jonathan Schwartz, Note, Prisoners of Proposition 13: Sales Taxes, Property Taxes,
and the Fiscalization of Municipal Land Use Decisions, 71 S. CAL. L. REV. 183, 184-86, 198-202
(1997) (arguing that increased limits on municipal taxing power has driven a “rush to generate
increased sales taxes by bringing shopping centers and large discount retailers to town”).
209 See id. at 198-202 (discussing pressures on municipal governments that lead them to promote land uses that will generate sales tax).
210 FISCHEL, supra note 1, at 16; see also id. at 4 (stating that homeowners “are the most
numerous and politically influential group within most localities”); id. at 15-16 (noting that though
developers are not powerless in smaller jurisdictions, their influence is limited because local
officials are “responsive to voters whose local economic stake is in the value of their homes and
only indirectly in the value of new development”).
211 See FISCHEL, supra note 28, at 212-14 (noting that in cities, the larger number of residents
and political issues create “[a]mple opportunity . . . for special interests to influence political
outcomes by lobbying officials, advertising about particular issues, or electioneering for candidates
who favor their interests”).
212 See Richard Briffault, The Local Government Boundary Problem in Metropolitan Areas, 48
STAN. L. REV. 1115, 1134-36 (1996) (discussing a political economy that causes municipalities to
“attract new residents and firms that add more to the per capita tax base than they will cost in
local services” and to “exclude new residents and activities that cost more . . . than they
contribute in tax base”); Richard Schragger, Consuming Government, 101 MICH. L. REV. 1824,
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evidence lends some support to this notion. A prominent study of five cities
that had conferred some land use authority on neighborhood groups found
that cities tended to defer to neighborhoods on most land use matters213
except where the development in question was a significant source of
revenue. Revenue-generating projects were nearly always approved regardless of neighborhood opposition.214 According to the authors, when “jobs
and sizable tax revenues are at stake, city hall will use the resources at its
command to see that the proposals come to fruition.”215
Although it is difficult to draw general conclusions, the foregoing discussion suggests that, at least in some circumstances, cities’ fiscal concerns and
the strong influence of developers will induce cities to closely monitor
neighborhoods’ exercise of the zoning power, thus minimizing the risk of
majoritarian exploitation and, concomitantly, the need for close judicial
scrutiny of neighborhood zoning districts.
b. The Special Assessment District
Ironically, these same factors—cities’ fiscal concerns and the influence of
developers—strongly suggest that cities will not closely monitor the activities of special assessment districts and BIDs, and therefore that these
entities warrant stricter judicial scrutiny than neighborhood zoning districts. If cities have incentives to ensure that revenue-generating projects
are approved despite neighborhood opposition, they have even greater
incentives to outsource the provision and financing of municipal functions
such as security and maintenance to quasi-privatized entities that can relieve
the city of the need to finance such services.216 Likewise, the influential
development interests that are often disadvantaged by the devolution of
zoning power to neighborhood groups are likely to be strong advocates of
special assessment districts and BIDs, which promise to boost the value of
their property and increase economic activity in the area.217
1834-47 (2003) (reviewing FISCHEL, supra note 1) (criticizing the political economy of suburbs in
which homeowners have incentives to exclude undesirable uses such as affordable housing).
213 See BERRY ET AL., supra note 8, at 141 (noting that “the neighborhood associations had an
unusually good [win-to-loss] ratio, winning half the issues they initiated and losing none”).
214 Id. at 142-44.
215 Id. at 144.
216 See Kessler v. Grand Cent. Dist. Mgmt. Ass’n, 158 F.3d 92, 131 (2d Cir. 1998) (Weinstein,
J., dissenting) (“BIDs decrease both the need and the incentive for the City to expand or maintain
the general municipal services it provides to the City as a whole.”); Briffault, supra note 6, at 395,
424-25 (discussing how BIDs reduce the need for city governments to expend public money on
business interests).
217 See Briffault, supra note 6, at 425 (noting that BIDs are viewed as “a means of attracting
and retaining business”).
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Here, I focus again on BIDs before returning to consider other types of
special assessment districts. The primary advocates of many BIDs are
highly influential, well-organized downtown business interests. BIDs often
draw the support of the wealthiest landowners in the city, who, “because of
their prominence, . . . have greater access to elected officials and significant opportunity to influence them.”218 Daniel Garodnick discusses one
chilling example of a BID’s influence on city policy. From 1992 to 1993,
New York City fired hundreds of sanitation workers and drastically reduced
its street-cleaning schedule as part of an austerity measure during a fiscal
crunch.219 Because BIDs picked up the slack in wealthier areas of the city,
“no pressure [came] from the city’s most influential citizens, and the former
street-cleaning schedule was never restored.”220
The very act of creating a BID takes a massive amount of resources and
organizational capacity.221 Once created, BIDs have the capacity to forge
their constituent landowners into an even more potent lobbying force. The
assessments that BIDs collect from landowners may be used not only to
provide services, but to press for favorable regulatory action from city
hall.222 In other words, when cities delegate to BIDs the ability to collect
mandatory assessments from all neighborhood landowners, they thereby
enable BIDs to exert continuing influence over city officials. And BIDs have
not been shy about flexing their muscle. They lobby forcefully for new laws
and enforcement of existing laws to advance their interests, such as legislation targeting street vendors, adult businesses, and the homeless.223
Consider, by contrast, the lobbying power of those who may be disadvantaged by the creation or operation of a BID. As detailed previously,
those most likely to be harmed are 1) landowners who dissented from the
decision to create the district and are forced to pay the assessment against
their will; 2) disenfranchised residential or commercial tenants; 3) unwanted
visitors such as street vendors, beggars, or the homeless; and 4) members of
the general public whose interests in the use of public space diverge from
those of the BID. As a general matter, it is reasonable to conclude that none

218
219

Garodnick, supra note 170, at 1763.
See id. (citing Moshe Adler, Why BID’s Are Bad Business, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 13, 2000, at

CY17).

220
221

Id. (quoting Adler, supra note 219).
See Briffault, supra note 6, at 383 (“The creation of a BID usually requires proponents to
invest considerable time, energy, and funds.”).
222 See id. at 441 (describing how tax funding gives BIDs advantages over other community
organizations, including the capacity to pressure city government to take action against undesirable private activity, or to increase enforcement of existing regulation).
223 See id. at 427-28.
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of these groups can match the organizational and resource advantages of the
BID and its supporters. The dissenting landowners, while they may be
influential business leaders, were obviously insufficiently influential to block
the formation of the BID. Tenants are typically difficult to organize because
they tend to be more transient and have less of a financial stake than
landowners.224 Individuals such as street peddlers, beggars, and the homeless are likely to lack the organizational capacity, professional connections,
resources, profit motive, or congruence of interest to effectively lobby city
hall against the geographically concentrated, homogeneously interested,
amply financed, highly motivated, and well-organized business interests
that support BIDs. Likewise, compared to BID proponents, individual
members of the public at large are likely too diffuse, heterogeneous, disorganized, and weakly interested in access to public space to mount an
effective fight against the BID.225
As a result of all the foregoing, although most state laws provide for city
oversight of BIDs, in practice BIDs have a considerable degree of autonomy.
City governments exercise little supervision over BIDs’ day-to-day
affairs.226 While there have been some instances in which city governments
have constrained BIDs—particularly a dispute of unknown provenance in
1998 between Mayor Rudolph Giuliani and New York City’s most prominent
BID, the Grand Central Partnership (GCP)227—BIDs nevertheless exercise
a substantial degree of independence.228 At a minimum, then, there is
reason to be leery that cities will exercise close oversight of BIDs.
If I have singled out BIDs for criticism here, a word should also be said
about the special-purpose districts involved in Salyer and Ball. Specialpurpose districts, though created at the state rather than the municipal
level, raise many of the same exploitation concerns as BIDs. The creation of
a special-purpose district, like the creation of a BID, requires organization
224 See Clayton P. Gillette, In Partial Praise of Dillon’s Rule, or, Can Public Choice Theory Justify
Local Government Law?, 67 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 959, 987-88 (1991) (listing reasons why tenants
face “substantial obstacles to collective action”); see also Fischel, NIMBYs, supra note 25, at 145
(noting that homeowners vote in municipal elections fifty percent more frequently than renters do).
225 Cf. Robert C. Ellickson, Controlling Chronic Misconduct in City Spaces: Of Panhandlers, Skid
Rows, and Public-Space Zoning, 105 YALE L.J. 1165, 1194-1200 (1996) (discussing the collective
action problem that prevents individual users of urban space from acting to prevent aggressive
panhandling).
226 See Briffault, supra note 6, at 410 (“The city government is likely to leave the BID’s dayto-day operations to the [district managing association].”).
227 See Garodnick, supra note 170, at 1757-59.
228 See Briffault, supra note 6, at 439-42, 456-57 (“BIDs have considerable autonomy in practice. Although the city government plays a central role in the process of BID formation, the city’s
involvement often drops off sharply once the BID is in operation.” (footnote omitted)).

2013]

Neighborhood Empowerment

987

and a huge expenditure of resources.229 Like BIDs, special districts are most
often established as a result of pressure from well-organized developers and
other business interests looking to finance infrastructure and services for
growth.230 These groups are able to circumvent opposition by strategically
drawing the district boundaries and by limiting the district functions to a
specialized purpose that the public perceives as technical and apolitical.231
As a result, opposition to special-purpose districts tends to be weak and
disorganized.232
In summary, BIDs and special assessment districts often raise greater
concerns about intra-group exploitation than do neighborhood zoning
districts. As before, however, this point should not be stated without
qualification. If the district in question is a “one-shot deal,” it is less likely
to form an organized interest group than a district that is empowered to act
on an ongoing basis. Furthermore, improvement districts located outside
downtown areas, such as in residential neighborhoods, may be less likely to
draw support from well-heeled downtown interests, and will raise fewer
concerns about access to public space. Thus, in any particular case, an ad
hoc inquiry will be necessary to determine whether a group disadvantaged
by a delegation of power has sufficient influence at the citywide level to
mitigate fears of majoritarian exploitation.
B. “Regulation” or “Supplemental Services”?
I previously mentioned that one distinction between the Eubank-Roberge
line and the Salyer-Ball line is that the former group of cases involved
challenges by enfranchised landowners who were subject to the districts’
regulatory authority, whereas the latter cases involved challenges by
nonlandowners who were not directly subject to the districts’ coercive
229 See BURNS, supra note 100, at 16-22, 75-108 (describing the collective action problems
involved in the creation of special-purpose districts).
230 See id. at 25-32.
231 See FOSTER, supra note 100, at 103-04 (arguing that special-purpose districts help developers avoid opposition to their projects because these districts enjoy “low political visibility, wide
administrative discretion, financial reach, geographic flexibility, and functional specialization”).
232 Bolen, admittedly, is a trickier case. On one hand, we could readily surmise that bringing
high-speed rail to downtown Los Angeles was likely a priority for Los Angeles’s business and
political elite, while principally antagonizing the less powerful industrial property owners and
residential or commercial tenants. Hence, Bolen raised the specter of a well-organized interest
group exploiting a less influential minority. On the other hand, however, high-speed rail is often
politically difficult to implement because of opposition from NIMBY homeowners. See, e.g.,
Special Report: Linear, THE SAINT INDEX (2011), http://saintindex.info/special-report-linear
(surveying homeowner attitudes toward development and concluding that “linear” developments
like high-speed rail are hardest to site because of opposition from NIMBYs and other groups).
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authority but sought the franchise on the grounds that the districts’ activities affected them.233 While I dismissed this distinction as irrelevant from
the standpoint of public choice theory, it could be argued that, setting
public choice theory aside, courts should more strictly scrutinize instances
where plaintiffs have been directly subject to a district’s coercive authority
(Eubank/Roberge) than where they have not (Salyer/Ball).
On a close reading, the case law and literature appear consistent with
this argument. For example, where the Eubank Court observed that the
Richmond zoning ordinance empowered one set of owners to determine
“the kind of use which another set of owners may make of their property,”234
the Ball Court stressed that the Salt River district “cannot enact any laws
governing the conduct of citizens”235 and that it “does not and cannot
control the use to which the landowners who are entitled to the water
choose to put it.”236 Similarly, the Kessler court emphasized that the GCDMA
“ha[d] no authority to enact or enforce any laws governing the conduct of
persons present in the district” or any other regulatory authority.237 Implicitly, then, the courts may be making the entirely sensible point that an
entity that engages in coercive regulation should be subject to stricter
constitutional constraints than one that merely provides services in a noncoercive way.
Commentators have also stressed the distinction between the regulatory
powers of zoning authorities and the noncoercive service-providing powers
of special assessment districts. For example, in an official report describing
California’s special-purpose districts, the California Senate Local Government Committee claimed that “general purpose” municipalities (i.e., cities
that exercise the zoning power) are distinct from “limited purpose” municipalities (such as water districts) because the former are empowered to
“regulate private behavior,” whereas the latter have only the power to “‘do
things,’ like building public works projects such as parks and sewers.”238
Similarly, in his proposal to create “block level improvement districts”
(BLIDs, inspired by BIDs), Robert Ellickson distinguishes the “supplementary” services he would authorize those districts to provide, such as sanitation

233
234
235
236
237
238

See supra notes 180-82 and accompanying text.
Eubank v. City of Richmond, 226 U.S. 137, 143 (1912).
Ball v. James, 451 U.S. 355, 366 (1981).
Id. at 367-68.
Kessler v. Grand Cent. Dist. Mgmt. Ass’n, 158 F.3d 92, 104 (2d Cir. 1998).
CAL. STATE SENATE LOCAL GOV’T COMM., WHAT’S SO SPECIAL ABOUT SPECIAL
DISTRICTS ? A C ITIZEN’S GUIDE TO SPECIAL DISTRICTS IN CALIFORNIA 3 (4th ed. 2010),
available at http://www.calafco.org/docs/Special_Districts/Whats_So_Special.pdf.
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or capital improvements, from “regulatory powers,” such as neighborhood
zoning, as to which he is far more skeptical.239
As before, however, this distinction between the coercive powers of
neighborhood zoning districts and the noncoercive powers of special
assessment districts proves false. First, while cases like Salyer and Ball
involved “one person, one vote” challenges brought by nonlandowners, the
vast majority of litigation involving special assessments, particularly BIDs,
has in fact been brought by landowners or business owners who voted
against the creation of the district but were outvoted by a majority of their
neighbors and thus forced to pay mandatory assessments against their
will.240 These cases, then, presented precisely the same concern as the
Roberge line—a majority of landowners within a territorially-defined district
was empowered to coerce a dissenting minority. Nevertheless, these cases
all uphold the validity of BID assessments without citing the Roberge line.241
Second, although BIDs and special assessment districts do not formally
coerce nonlandowners, they exercise strong de facto coercive authority over
nonlandowners within the area. Thus, the Salyer-Ball line cannot be meaningfully distinguished from the Eubank-Roberge line on this basis. In the
remainder of this section, I elaborate on each of the two arguments presented
here.
1. Landowner Challenges
The distinction Ellickson draws between the “supplementary” services
provided by special assessment districts and the “regulatory” activities
undertaken by neighborhood zoning districts fails because special assessment
239 See Ellickson, supra note 2, at 96-99 (advocating BLIDs that would perform a wide range
of supplementary services but have only limited regulatory powers such as the granting of a
zoning variance). In his landmark article on BIDs, Richard Briffault also states that BIDs do not
“regulate.” See Briffault, supra note 6, at 407-08 (“BIDs are rarely, if ever, authorized to regulate
the activities of district landowners, merchants, or residents directly.”).
240 See, e.g., McGowan v. Capital Ctr., Inc., 19 F. Supp. 2d 642, 644-45 (S.D. Miss. 1998)
(landowners challenging an assessment levied by a landowner-created BID); Evans v. City of San
Jose, 4 Cal. Rptr. 2d 601, 602-03 (Ct. App. 1992) (business owner challenging an assessment of a
business owner–supported BID); Jensen v. City & County of Denver, 806 P.2d 381, 383 (Colo.
1991) (en banc) (same); City of Seattle v. Rogers Clothing for Men, Inc., 787 P.2d 39, 41-42
(Wash. 1990) (en banc) (business owners challenging an assessment levied by a business owner–
created BID).
241 I discovered only one case in which a court considered a special assessment district to
raise a delegation question under Eubank and Roberge, and, even there, the reference to Eubank and
Roberge appeared only in a partial concurrence. See Tex. Boll Weevil Eradication Found., Inc. v.
Lewellen, 952 S.W.2d 454, 488 (Tex. 1997) (Hecht, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part,
and concurring in the judgment) (concurring in the invalidation of a special assessment district as
an improper delegation and citing Roberge and Eubank).
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districts do regulate just as surely as neighborhood zoning districts do.
While the primary function of the special assessment district is to provide
services, that function would be impossible to carry out if the district did
not also possess one critical “regulatory” power: the ability to coerce all
landowners within its territorial jurisdiction to pay a mandatory assessment
to defray the cost of a service provided regardless of whether those landowners desire the service. As discussed previously, and as Ellickson himself
acknowledges, the element of coercion is essential to the success of the
special assessment district, as it is to the neighborhood zoning district, in
order to overcome the collective action problem that entices landowners to
free ride.242 Thus, as I have noted, most of the litigation regarding special
assessments and BIDs has in fact been brought by landowners complaining
about having to pay a mandatory assessment imposed upon them by a
majority vote of their neighbors.243
Although both special assessment districts and neighborhood zoning
districts are predicated on coercive regulation, a skeptic might nevertheless
argue that a mere requirement to pay money is not nearly as onerous an
encroachment upon one’s property rights as the deprivation of a landowner’s
ability to determine the appropriate use of his or her land. However, a
special assessment is not simply a requirement to pay money. The imprimatur
of government authority makes it far more potent: a special assessment is a
lien on one’s land, meaning that it runs with the land, binds subsequent
purchasers, and can result in foreclosure if unpaid.244 In some states, a
delinquent special assessment lien becomes a personal liability of the
landowner, which may be satisfied from the landowner’s wages or other
assets.245
Indeed, at common law, courts considered an affirmative burden upon
one’s land, such as a covenant to pay money, to be a far more severe restraint

242 See Briffault, supra note 6, at 394 (“The coercive assessment is essential to the BID.”);
Ellickson, supra note 2, at 93 (proposing to overcome the free rider problem through a BLID in
which all benefitted owners would be required to pay assessments, regardless of consent); id. at 107
(acknowledging that the BLID proposal may constitute a “threat to freedom because it would not
be created by unanimous consent of the governed”).
243 See supra note 240.
244 See, e.g., OSBORNE M. REYNOLDS, JR., HANDBOOK OF LOCAL G OVERNMENT L AW
§ 99, at 352 (2d ed. 2001) (“Where assessments are not paid on time the usual method of
enforcement is a lien on the property benefited.”); Briffault, supra note 6, at 393 (listing various
consequences of failing to pay an assessment including delinquency sale and filing of a lien).
245 See REYNOLDS, supra note 244, § 99.
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on land ownership than a negative restriction on that land’s use.246 Until
modern times, courts refused to enforce affirmative covenants against
successors who had not expressly contracted for such an obligation, while
freely enforcing negative servitudes against subsequent purchasers with
notice.247 In the courts’ view, a negative restriction limits a landowner’s
potential investment loss to the value of the land itself. The landowner can
simply walk away from the property if it turns out to be an unwise investment. An affirmative obligation, by contrast, endures even if the land
becomes worthless, putting all the landowner’s assets at risk.248 Although
affirmative covenants that run with the land are now generally enforceable,249 courts remain wary about affirmative obligations and frequently
refuse to enforce affirmative covenants they perceive as overly burdensome.250
Judicial intuitions about the burdens of affirmative obligations are frequently confirmed in the special assessment context. In fact, as previously
observed, the vast majority of lawsuits concerning special assessment
districts are brought by assessed landowners complaining about having to
pay the assessment.251 Although special assessments tend to be relatively
small compared to property taxes, landowners often complain that they are
excessive when added to the existing burden of mortgage payments, homeowners association fees, homeowners insurance, and property taxes—the
latter of which figure to grow even larger if the special assessment district

246 See DUKEMINIER ET AL., supra note 18, at 873 (explaining that an affirmative covenant
“may impose a large personal liability on a successor” while a negative covenant “limits the
successor’s loss to the investment in the land itself”).
247 See id. at 873-74, 892-95 (describing uses that illustrate the contrasting positions courts
took on affirmative covenants and negative covenants).
248 Id. A particularly chilling case is Pocono Springs Civic Ass’n v. MacKenzie, 667 A.2d 233
(Pa. Super. Ct. 1995). In that case, the appellants unknowingly bought property within a
homeowners association that was incapable of development because the lot did not meet township
sewage requirements. Id. at 234. The appellants attempted several times without success to
relinquish the property by sale, abandonment and foreclosure. Id. at 235. The court held that, as
the title owners, the appellants remained personally liable for the annual homeowners association
assessments even though their land had become worthless. Id. at 235-36.
249 See, e.g., Neponsit Prop. Owners’ Ass’n v. Emigrant Indus. Sav. Bank, 15 N.E.2d 793,
795, 798 (N.Y. 1938) (holding that an affirmative covenant obligating owners to pay annual
assessment to a homeowners’ association runs with the land and binds subsequent purchasers with
notice). The Restatement of Property likewise provides that almost all affirmative and negative
covenants are enforceable. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: SERVITUDES § 3.2 (2000).
250 See DUKEMINIER ET AL., supra note 18, at 873 (discussing an “illustrative” case in which
a California court refused to enforce an affirmative covenant requiring a successor to rebuild and
maintain a golf course that had fallen into disrepair).
251 See Briffault, supra note 6, at 446 (noting that most litigation against BIDs is filed by
property owners who feel that their BID assessments are too burdensome).

992

University of Pennsylvania Law Review

[Vol. 161: 939

fulfills its promise to increase property values.252 In addition to the unwanted
financial burden, many landowners believe that they receive no real value
from a special assessment that has been forced upon them for the benefit of
others. For example, a business owner who has recently invested in an
expensive security system might oppose paying for additional security
services.253 Worse, a special assessment may force a landowner to pay for
services that actually harm her personal interests. For instance, a homeowner may be charged an assessment for road improvements that threaten
to flood her own property.254 The owner of an adult business may pay
mandatory assessments to a BID, only to find that the BID is using the
assessed funds on a lobbying campaign to make adult businesses illegal in
the district.255
There is no doubt that many zoning restrictions are just as onerous, if
not more so, than special assessments. However, a landowner aggrieved by
an abusive zoning law at least has the opportunity to seek judicial relief
through the Federal Takings, Due Process, Equal Protection, Freedom of
Speech, or Free Exercise of Religion Clauses, as well as state law doctrines
like nonconforming use or vested rights.256 While many property rights
advocates have complained about the ineffectiveness of some of these
doctrines,257 landowners still enjoy far more protection against adverse
zoning changes than they do against unwanted special assessments. As to
the latter, courts defer very broadly to determinations about who is subject to
a special assessment, and how much they should be assessed.258 Federal

252
253

See id. at 384-85.
See, e.g., id. at 384 (providing the example of landowners who may “already be providing
the supplemental sanitation and security services that the BID would offer”).
254 See, e.g., Herón Márquez Estrada & Joy Powell, Project Produces a Street Fight, STAR
TRIB. (Minneapolis-St. Paul) (Mar. 5, 2011), http://www.startribune.com/local/south/117275103.
html (describing a lawsuit by residents required to pay for a street improvement project that is
flooding their properties).
255 See Briffault, supra note 6, at 406-07, 427 (noting that some BIDs lobby city governments
“for new laws or the enforcement of existing laws against . . . shops that sell pornography”).
256 For an overview of landowners’ major avenues for challenging zoning ordinances, see
generally ELLICKSON & BEEN, supra note 5, at 125-232.
257 See generally, e.g., Erin O’Hara, Property Rights and the Police Powers of the State: Regulatory
Takings: An Oxymoron? (arguing that Supreme Court’s regulatory takings doctrine does not
provide much protection for property rights), in LAND RIGHTS: THE 1990S’ PROPERTY
RIGHTS REBELLION 31 (Bruce Yandle ed., 1995).
258 See REYNOLDS, supra note 244, § 99 (“It is often held to be within the legislative discretion of the local governing authorities as to . . . when to use special assessments against particular
properties.”).
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courts have long abandoned any solicitude for landowners complaining
about assessments.259
2. Nonlandowner Challenges
What has been said thus far concerns only the impacts that BIDs and
special assessment districts have upon landowners. By contrast, the SalyerBall line involved challenges brought by nonlandowners who were not
directly subject to the districts’ power to coerce mandatory assessments.
Arguably, then, it would be inappropriate to analogize these cases to the
Eubank-Roberge line, which involved landowner challenges to the coercive
authority of neighborhood zoning districts.
The previous Section showed, however, that BIDs and special assessment districts have significant impacts on nonlandowners within their
territories, impacts that are in fact qualitatively similar to the coercive
effects of zoning regulations. Like zoning regulations, for example, BIDs
actively manage public space in a way that can substantially affect residents’
quality of life, such as sparking rent increases, changes in local retail options,
or other alterations to neighborhood character.260 Through their management of public space, furthermore, BIDs can entice desirable populations
such as tourists, and drive away undesirable people such as food vendors or
the homeless. Ellickson goes so far as to state that “the control of disorderly
street people” is one of the BID’s “central functions.”261 Richard Schragger
accordingly argues that despite Kessler’s description of the BID as an
innocuous provider of aesthetic services that affect only landowners, BIDs
engage actively in “defining and delineating the contours of public space
itself.”262 Thus, while BIDs may not possess formal regulatory powers over
nonlandowners, they have strong de facto authority over nonlandowners,
and using that authority is one of their major reasons for being.263
259 See Louisville & Nashville R.R. v. Barber Asphalt Paving Co., 197 U.S. 430, 432-35
(1905) (holding that an assessment for a street improvement did “not go beyond the bounds set by
the Fourteenth Amendment”); see also French v. Barber Asphalt Paving Co., 181 U.S. 324, 343
(1901) (asserting that assessments are generally constitutional and noting that it is up to the
legislature to determine how to appropriately distribute the burdens of the assessment across
landowners).
260 See supra subsection III.A.1.b.iii.
261 See Ellickson, supra note 225, at 1199.
262 Schragger, supra note 168, at 457; see also id. at 449-50 (arguing that the Kessler court ignored significant impacts of GCDMA on nonlandowners by describing the BID’s powers as
“essentially aesthetic”).
263 In his definitive article on BIDs, Richard Briffault argues that BIDs lack real autonomy
and hence should not be subject to the “one person, one vote” rule, but he acknowledges that the
question is a close one. See Briffault, supra note 6, at 438-45. Briffault’s argument is subtle, but it is
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By contrast, although neighborhood zoning districts may have significant impacts on nonlandowners, such as prospective residents of affordable
housing (a point I address in the next Section,) it is unlikely that neighborhood zoning districts will have the kinds of impacts on nonlandowners that
BIDs do because they tend to operate in homogeneous residential neighborhoods rather than diverse downtown areas where the interests of tenants,
vendors, street people, and other users are often implicated. In fact, all of
the cases that I have discovered to date challenging the validity of neighborhood zoning districts have been brought by landowners.264 As noted earlier,
the fact that special assessment districts have frequently confronted legal
challenges from both landowners and nonlandowners, whereas neighborhood zoning districts have primarily been assailed only by landowners,
strongly suggests that the former present greater cause for concern than the
latter.265
In conclusion, insofar as special assessment districts exercise coercive
regulatory powers that have the potential to dramatically impact the rights
of landowners and nonlandowners within their jurisdiction, they cannot be
subject to any less constitutional scrutiny than neighborhood zoning districts.
C. Spillovers and Comprehensive Planning
There is one more way in which neighborhood zoning districts may be
distinguished from special assessment districts. The doctrine and scholarship
imply that one concern with neighborhood control of zoning is its potential
to impose negative spillover impacts on neighboring areas and disrupt
comprehensive land use planning on a citywide basis. While this is a valid
concern, it is not a meaningful way of distinguishing special assessment
districts from neighborhood zoning districts because the former are just as
likely as the latter to cause harmful spillovers and impair comprehensive
planning. Indeed, special assessment districts may be more likely to create
these problems.
The concern about spillovers is evident in existing scholarship about
neighborhood zoning control. As discussed previously, Robert Ellickson and
George Liebmann have proposed the creation of neighborhood or blockunconvincing in at least one major respect. Like Ellickson, he stresses that BIDs do not “regulate.”
Id. at 442. However, as just discussed, BIDs certainly exercise as much regulatory power as
neighborhood zoning districts do.
As discussed in Section III.B, supra, the water districts in Salyer and Ball and the special
assessment districts in Bolen also had substantial impacts on nonlandowners.
264 See cases cited supra note 240.
265 See supra subsections III.B.1–2.
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level improvement districts that would bring the advantages of BID governance to residential or other neighborhoods outside the downtown areas
where BIDs traditionally functioned.266 However, both Ellickson and
Liebmann reject the idea of allocating anything more than token zoning
authority to these neighborhood groups. Liebmann would permit neighborhood associations to waive applicable zoning restrictions, but rejects neighborhood power to impose zoning restrictions “because of the external effects
that can result from them.”267 Ellickson likewise endorses the ability of
block-front groups to waive otherwise applicable restrictions where “spillover
effects are limited,” but not where doing so would impose “neighborhoodwide negative externalities.”268
Although neither Ellickson nor Liebmann expands on his reasons for
objecting to neighborhood zoning control, the concern appears to be that if
a neighborhood has unfettered ability to control its own land use, it can
enact land use policies with little regard for the impact of its policies on
neighboring areas or on the region as a whole. Many neighborhood groups,
for example, will reflexively fall back upon NIMBY impulses and simply
exclude unwanted land uses that may be in great demand on a citywide or
regional basis. Suppose that a city has a desperate need for more affordable
housing and that a developer proposes to site a low-income housing project
in a particular neighborhood. If the neighborhood has the power to approve
or disapprove new affordable housing projects, and if the landowners within
the neighborhood determine that the affordable housing project will
potentially diminish their own property values or quality of life, they will
likely reject the project despite the citywide need for affordable housing.
Doing so will then place pressure on neighboring areas to approve a site for
the housing project, but if each neighborhood has the independent power to
approve its own land uses, the housing project may find no suitable location
anywhere in the city.269
Neighborhood zoning control can also be problematic when neighborhoods seek to include new uses instead of excluding them. If a neighborhood
permits development at too rapid a pace, for example, it may place enormous
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See supra notes 132-34 and accompanying text.
Liebmann, supra note 12, at 362; see also Merrill, supra note 56, at 303 (favoring neighborhood land use powers where the impacts are locally confined, but not where they have regional
impacts).
268 Ellickson, supra note 2, at 98-99.
269 See supra notes 198-200 and accompanying text (discussing the difficulty of finding appropriate sites for LULUs because of neighborhood opposition).
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strain on the city’s infrastructure or school system.270 In short, the structure
of the neighborhood zoning district, which empowers landowners to make
land use decisions based on how a particular new neighborhood entrant will
affect their own property values, practically assures that each neighborhood
will consider its own interests alone and ignore the citywide impacts of its
zoning decisions.
This concern with external impacts may implicitly underlie the Roberge
doctrine as well. As I have noted previously, one of the many curiosities
surrounding the Roberge line, and the Roberge decision in particular, is that it
followed closely on the heels of the epochal Euclid decision of two years
earlier, which broadly upheld the constitutionality of local zoning.271
However, it is possible to distinguish Roberge from Euclid. The Euclid court
placed substantial weight on the “comprehensive zoning plan” adopted by
the village of Euclid, Ohio, for the rational development of the village as a
whole.272 Although the respondent, Ambler Realty, objected that Euclid’s
limitations on industrial development would divert such development to
neighboring communities, the Court rebutted this argument by noting that
the village had not banned industrial development entirely, but merely
directed it to appropriate areas within the community where it would not
disturb residential uses.273 The Court also issued an important caveat that if,
in some future case, a municipality acted in such a way as to harm “the
general public interest,” the Court might intervene.274 Roberge may have
270 William Fischel has criticized Robert Nelson’s proposal to create permanent neighborhood zoning districts on this very ground. Fischel argues that disaggregating the zoning power
from other municipal functions will cause zoning decisions to be made without consideration of
their impacts on these other functions. He provides an instructive example from New Hampshire:
a municipal zoning ordinance effectively prevents any children of school age from residing in a
section of town from which access to the local schools is extremely costly. If the district controlled
its own zoning, Fischel argues, it would lift that zoning restriction without regard to whether
doing so would inflict a burden on the community as a whole. See William A. Fischel, Voting, Risk
Aversion, and the NIMBY Syndrome: A Comment on Robert Nelson’s “Privatizing the Neighborhood,” 7
GEO. MASON L. REV. 881, 899-901 (1999); see also David L. Callies, et al., Ramapo Looking
Forward: Gated Communities, Covenants, and Concerns, 35 URB. LAW. 177, 197 (2003) (“[Any]
privatized ‘zoning’ effort itself results in uncoordinated land use planning of the area. . . . Air
quality, property values, environmental preservation, efficient public services, and well-located
schools all are better coordinated by a more regional government responsible for the region's
public services.” (footnote omitted)).
271 See supra notes 83-84 and accompanying text.
272 Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365, 379 (1926); see also id. at 379-83 (describing at
length the village’s detailed development plan).
273 See id. at 389-90 (“[Euclid’s] governing authorities . . . have determined, not that industrial development shall cease at its boundaries, but that the course of such development shall
proceed within definitely fixed lines.”).
274 Id. at 390.
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been just such a case. In Roberge, there could be no assurance, as there was
in Euclid, that the city of Seattle had comprehensively planned its land use
needs and ensured an appropriate place for all uses because the city had
delegated portions of its land use power to landowners without providing
any standards to guide the exercise of that power. Absent standards,
landowners were free to base their zoning decisions on “caprice” or other
“selfish reasons.”275 In other words, landowners could make decisions
without regard to the welfare of surrounding areas or the city as a whole.
Neither the jurisprudence nor the commentary on neighborhood control
of zoning addresses the possibility that special assessment districts or BIDs
may similarly generate externalities or impair comprehensive planning. At
first blush, indeed, it may appear as though one neighborhood’s decision to
upgrade its sewer lines or provide itself with supplemental sanitation or
security services cannot possibly impose any burden on neighboring areas,
impair any municipal planning objectives, or strain city infrastructure—to
the contrary, special assessment districts promise only to improve such
infrastructure. However, as this Section shows, special assessment districts
can create just as much havoc with municipal planning schemes and impose
just as serious externalities on surrounding areas as neighborhood zoning
districts are thought to do. Moreover, while it is possible that neighborhood
zoning districts will increase the incidence of sloppy and haphazard land use
planning, the reverse scenario is also plausible: neighborhood control of
zoning may actually alleviate some of the haphazardness that exists in our
current system of land use control. In short, neighborhood zoning districts
may once again produce sounder public policy outcomes than special
assessment districts.
1. The Neighborhood Zoning District
Taking neighborhood zoning first, I should start by puncturing the myth
that the current system of land use planning in this country in any way
conforms to the Euclidean ideal of comprehensive planning. For a variety of
reasons, the number of incorporated general-purpose municipalities (i.e.,
municipalities empowered to utilize the zoning power) has exploded in the
years since Euclid was decided.276 Most metropolitan regions today are
comprised of several dozen municipalities, many of which are small suburban
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Washington ex rel. Seattle Title Trust Co. v. Roberge, 278 U.S. 116, 122 (1928).
See Briffault, supra note 3, at 356-82 (noting the increasing number of small suburban
municipalities and discussing some of the causes of that phenomenon).
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communities no larger than a neighborhood.277 The proliferation of small
incorporated municipalities has generated virulent competition for tax
revenue and a concomitant “fiscalization” of land use, in which each municipality regulates land use in order to maximize contributions to the municipal fisc rather than in accordance with some comprehensive land use plan
for the harmonious development of the community.278 Despite Euclid,
courts have largely accepted this practice, rarely requiring that municipalities’ land use policies comply with anything resembling the comprehensive
zoning plan in the Euclid case. For example, where Euclid was careful to
emphasize that the village of Euclid was not entirely precluding industrial
use,279 in the years since Euclid, courts have endorsed innovations such as
“exclusionary” zoning in which unwanted land uses such as industry or
affordable housing are simply excluded from an entire city, either de facto
or de jure, without requiring that municipalities consider the impacts of
such exclusionary policies on the surrounding region.280 Furthermore,
courts have recognized and apparently accepted that cities use zoning for
their own selfish, fiscal purposes—essentially, to bring in land uses and
improvements that will enhance property values and the local tax base while
excluding land uses that do the opposite.281 With few exceptions, courts
277 See Richard Briffault, Our Localism: Part I—The Structure of Local Government Law, 90
COLUM. L. REV. 1, 77 (1990) (noting that “in most metropolitan areas, there are dozens of
independent municipalities” and that “[m]ore than three-quarters of all municipalities have fewer
than 5,000 inhabitants”).
278 See Schwartz, supra note 208, at 198-204 (discussing the “fiscalization” of land use and its
implications for cities). Although municipal land use authority is formally subject to control by the
state, in practice states almost never interfere in municipal land use decisions and, to the contrary,
consistently act to enable municipal autonomy. See Briffault, supra note 277, at 59, 64 (arguing that
state legislative involvement in local affairs reveals “a deep commitment to strong decision-making
roles for local governments, protection of local communities from outside interference, reluctance
to displace local choices and unwillingness to address the social and economic differences among
localities”).
279 Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365, 390 (1926).
280 See, e.g., Village of Arlington Heights v. Metro. Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 254-58,
270-71 (1977) (upholding the city’s exclusion of a low-income housing project against an equal
protection challenge where the city was zoned primarily for single-family homes and only 27
residents in a city of 64,000 were black because there was insufficient evidence of racially
discriminatory motivation for the exclusion); Village of Belle Terre v. Boraas, 416 U.S. 1, 2-3, 9
(1974) (approving a zoning ordinance barring all uses other than owner-occupied single-family
residences anywhere within the municipal borders); Duffcon Concrete Prods., Inc. v. Borough of
Cresskill, 64 A.2d 347, 351 (N.J. 1949) (approving a zoning ordinance barring nonresidential uses
and noting the availability of suitable land for industrial use elsewhere in the region).
281 See, e.g., Arlington Heights, 429 U.S. at 258, 270 (accepting the city’s asserted rationale that
its refusal to change its zoning requirements to permit affordable housing was based on existing
residents’ “reliance” on existing zoning and the related concern that rezoning would cause a
decline in property values).
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have simply ignored Euclid’s caveat to protect the “general public interest.”282
As a result, siting unwanted land uses such as affordable housing has
become a major problem nationwide.283
On the surface, delegating zoning power to neighborhood groups would
exacerbate this trend. Given that the disturbing, beggar-thy-neighbor
approach prevalent in current land use planning has largely been the result
of the fragmentation of land use authority, it could hardly help matters to
introduce even more fragmentation by dramatically increasing the number of
regulatory entities privileged to engage in exclusionary policies. Or could it?
Unlike the incorporated suburbs that ring our urban centers, neighborhoods would receive their zoning powers from, and ultimately be accountable to, the city government that empowered them. Where states have few
incentives to supervise municipal zoning practices, zoning is a major source
of power and revenue for cities. Thus, they will have tremendous incentives
to closely monitor neighborhood zoning to ensure that neighborhoods do
not unduly burden other areas of the city with externalities or impair
citywide planning objectives. The relevant empirical studies, discussed
previously, establish that where cities have delegated some zoning authority
to neighborhood groups, they have not been shy about asserting themselves
when other city priorities are at stake.284
Cities can assert their supervisory control over neighborhood zoning
districts in many ways. They may delegate only certain zoning powers to
neighborhoods, such as the power to regulate particular land uses or the
power to waive but not impose restrictions. Alternatively, they may delegate only to certain neighborhoods, such as homogeneously residential or
lightly developed areas.285 They could also give neighborhoods an initiatory

282 The major exception is Southern Burlington County NAACP v. Township of Mount Laurel,
336 A.2d 713 (N.J. 1975), which struck down an exclusionary zoning ordinance and rejected fiscal
concerns as a valid basis for exclusionary zoning practices, citing Euclid’s “general public interest”
caveat. Id. at 726, 731. And that holding faced considerable resistance. See S. Burlington Cnty.
NAACP v. Township of Mt. Laurel, 456 A.2d 390, 410 (N.J. 1983) (noting that nearly a decade
later, Mt. Laurel’s zoning remained “blatantly exclusionary” and that Mt. Laurel was “not alone”).
New Jersey Governor Chris Christie recently referred to the original Mount Laurel decision as “an
abomination.” See ChrisChristieVideos, Chris Christie—Mt. Laurel Decision is an ABOMINATION,
YOUTUBE (Sept. 16, 2011), http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=MWRSpKkoQnc; Nancy Solomon,
Uncertain Fate for Decision That Paved the Way for Affordable Housing in NJ, WNYC (May 7, 2012),
http://www.wnyc.org/articles/new-jersey-news/2012/may/07/affordable.
283 See supra notes 198-200 and accompanying text.
284 See BERRY ET AL., supra note 8, at 142-44, 298 (finding that individual neighborhood
groups are generally unable to impede large projects important to a city’s economic future).
285 The delegation schemes in Roberge, Cusack, and Eubank, of course did precisely this, delegating narrowly tailored land use powers to specific neighborhoods. See supra Section II.A.
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power subject to an override by the city council,286 or include sunset
provisions that require reauthorization of the zoning power after a certain
period of time. Finally, of course, municipalities can always repeal a delegation of power at any time, as neighborhoods have no vested right to control
their own zoning.287 In effect, a scheme of neighborhood zoning power
under loose city control would resemble a form of regional or metropolitan
government about which scholars have fantasized for decades.288
Indeed, such a scheme could actually help reverse the current pattern of
fragmented land use planning. The delegation of some limited land use
powers to neighborhoods may discourage landowners from fleeing the city
for incorporated suburbs where they can exercise the zoning power with
total impunity. Historically, many home and business owners left the city
for the suburbs because, among other things, in the suburbs they could
much more easily control their immediate environment through zoning.289
286 See, e.g., Tippett v. City of Hernando, 780 So.2d 649, 650-52 (Miss. Ct. App. 2000)
(describing a law requiring a supermajority of the municipality’s legislators to ratify any zoning
change being protested by those near the proposed change); Eadie v. Town Bd., 854 N.E.2d 464,
467 (N.Y. 2006) (upholding a statute requiring a supermajority vote of the town board to approve
certain zoning changes after a written protest by a certain percentage of landowners in a designated
proximity to the proposed change).
287 See Rodgers v. Village of Tarrytown, 96 N.E.2d 731, 733 (N.Y. 1951) (“[P]ersons who own
property in a particular zone or use district enjoy no vested right to that classification if the public
interest demands otherwise.”); see also, e.g., Grund v. Jefferson County, 277 So.2d 334, 338 (Ala.
1973) (stating that property owners have no vested right in the zoning classification of their
property); Spiker v. City of Lakewood, 603 P.2d 130, 133 (Colo. 1979) (en banc) (same); McGee v.
City of Cocoa, 168 So. 2d 766, 769 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1964) (same); Norbeck Vill. Joint Venture
v. Montgomery Cnty. Council, 254 A.2d 700, 705 (Md. 1969) (same); Navin v. Town of Exeter,
339 A.2d 12, 14 (N.H. 1975) (same); Gray v. Trustees, 313 N.E.2d 366, 369 (Ohio 1974) (same);
Buhler v. Racine County, 146 N.W.2d 403, 408 (Wis. 1966) (same).
288 See Briffault, supra note 2, at 526-28 (considering “sublocal structures” within cities to be
“something akin to a metropolitan political structure,” and noting that the spillover effects of
sublocal structures are more limited than those of localities because the former are subject to
control by a locality whereas the latter are not). Scholars have long dreamed of unifying the
patchwork of local government structures under some form of regional government that can
minimize harmful externalities and interlocal inequalities, but regional government has largely
failed to materialize because of opposition from vested interests in the existing system of local
government, most prominently suburban dwellers who are loathe to lose autonomy over their
schools, land use, and taxing powers. See, e.g., Cashin, supra note 2, at 2015-27 (discussing barriers
to regionalism).
289 See MICHAEL N. DANIELSON, T HE POLITICS OF EXCLUSION 4, 35-39 (1976) (“Most
suburban jurisdictions . . . have relatively homogeneous populations, which makes it easier to
secure consensus on exclusionary policies than is commonly the case in larger and more heterogeneous cities.”). The ability of neighborhood organizations to combat flight to the suburbs was
recognized as early as the 1930s. In 1935, Herbert Nelson, the Executive Secretary of the National
Association of Real Estate Boards advocated for the creation of urban “Neighborhood Improvement Districts,” stating that “the flight to the suburbs which we have witnessed during the past
ten or fifteen years . . . was caused . . . by the desire of people to preserve the home environment.”
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If cities were empowered to import some suburban-style zoning control, it
might stem the impulse to flee the city. While urban landowners still would
not have total control over their own zoning, they would at least have some
control. And that fact, along with the substantial costs involved in selling
their homes at depressed values, leaving behind relationships, forfeiting
social capital to put down roots somewhere new, and giving up the amenities
of urban living could help tilt the balance in deciding whether to move.290
Thus, neighborhood zoning districts cannot be dismissed on the grounds
that they—more so than incorporated municipalities—impede comprehensive planning or impose overly burdensome externalities on neighboring
communities.
2. The Special Assessment District
Conversely, special assessment districts can have severe impacts on urban
planning objectives, and may create substantial spillover effects. An increase
in development, business activity, or investment in one area of town will
likely increase traffic, noise, and pressure on infrastructure in surrounding
neighborhoods, while simultaneously siphoning off business and investment
from those areas.291 Moreover, if the BID or special assessment district is
successful in its mission to increase property values, higher rents will likely
result, which may displace both residential and commercial tenants who
then must find rental units elsewhere in the region.292 Likewise, BIDs’
efforts to make their jurisdictions attractive to tourists may “displace crime

Marc A. Weiss & John T. Metzger, The American Real Estate Industry and the Origins of Neighborhood Conservation, in PROCEEDINGS OF THE FIFTH NATIONAL CONFERENCE ON AMERICAN
PLANNING HISTORY 753, 758 (Laurence C. Gerckens ed., 1994) (citation omitted).
290 Robert Nelson further argues that neighborhood control of zoning can actually solve the
LULU problem by enabling neighborhood groups to receive compensation for permitting LULUs
into their neighborhoods. See Nelson, supra note 30, at 846 (noting that it might be more efficient
“to allow the [advocate of the LULU] to negotiate with the neighbors living nearby, rather than
issuing an absolute prohibition on . . . zoning grounds”). As Nelson acknowledges, however, this
solution would require courts to permit neighborhoods to expressly sell zoning rights, something
courts have been reluctant to do. Id. at 835, 848-49. Nevertheless, this is another potential
advantage of neighborhood zoning control.
291 See Briffault, supra note 6, at 456 (“BID marketing and development programs may draw
customers and investment away from other areas of the city.”). Sociologist Nathan Glazer has
similarly argued that New York City’s zoning laws, which permitted and indeed encouraged
massive density in the borough of Manhattan, caused the “withering of major subordinate business
centers in the Bronx and Brooklyn” and the loss of urban amenities in areas outside the city’s
dense core. NATHAN GLAZER, FROM A CAUSE TO A STYLE 238 (2007).
292 See supra notes 168-69 and accompanying text.
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and social problems onto adjacent communities.”293 Finally, BIDs have been
known to use their substantial lobbying power to push for zoning changes,
such as the prohibition of adult businesses, which then must be absorbed by
other neighborhoods.294
BIDs and special assessment districts can also create a qualitatively
different, but perhaps more significant, spillover effect by causing intralocal
inequalities in the provision of services that can erode a city’s social fabric.
Empowering territorially demarcated jurisdictions to finance their own
infrastructure and services has an inherent tendency to balkanize the urban
environment into enclaves that reinforce, among other things, class, income,
and racial divisions. BIDs and special assessment districts are part of a “get
what you pay for” model of municipal financing, in which the quantity and
quality of services each neighborhood receives are based entirely on its
ability to pay.295 The result is that wealthy neighborhoods that can afford
the added burden of assessments will voluntarily assume that burden in
order to finance and obtain highly desirable services, while poor neighborhoods may decline to approve an assessment—even for services they
desperately need—if they decide the assessment is too costly.296 While
services financed by assessments are theoretically supposed to be supplemental, cities have strong incentives to reduce their expenditures by “outsourcing”
the provision of municipal services to special assessment districts.297 As a
result, where special assessments are a major source of municipal financing—
such as in the Sunbelt states, where constitutional limits or extreme political
hostility often block tax increases—large inequalities persist between rich,
white neighborhoods and poor, minority neighborhoods.298 Such inequalities can, of course, breed resentment as poor neighborhoods endure
293 Briffault, supra note 6, at 456. But see Philip J. Cook & John MacDonald, Public Safety
Through Private Action: An Economic Assessment of BIDs, 121 ECON J. 445, 458 (2011) (finding that
“BIDs have no meaningful effect on crime in nearby areas”).
294 See supra note 165 and accompanying text.
295 See Reynolds, supra note 5, at 432-33.
296 See Briffault, supra note 2, at 528-29; Reynolds, supra note 5, at 433-34 (acknowledging
“the troubling implications” of a system that “explicitly limit[s] access to municipal services on the
basis of ability to pay”).
297 See supra note 216; see also Reynolds, supra note 5, at 433 (“If those who can pay for a
better level of services are content, the pressure to enhance service across the municipality is
generally reduced.”).
298 A troubling example of this trend was implicated in Hadnott v. City of Prattville, 309 F.
Supp. 967 (M.D. Ala. 1970). As a result of a local government practice by which street pavings
were provided only upon a petition of landowners willing to pay a special assessment to finance it,
ninety-seven percent of white residents lived on paved streets, whereas only sixty-five percent of
black residents did. Id. at 970. Because there was no evidence of racially discriminatory intent, the
court found that the scheme did not offend the Federal Equal Protection Clause. Id.
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substandard services while nearby wealthy neighborhoods lavish themselves
with improvements. Two prominent scholars have even speculated that one
underlying cause of Los Angeles’s Rodney King riots in the summer of 1992
was the city’s use of a geographically targeted financing mechanism to
shower downtown Los Angeles with millions of dollars in redevelopment
money while neglecting adjacent minority neighborhoods.299
In sum, special assessment districts may be just as troublesome for advocates of comprehensive planning, and just as likely to cause undesirable
spillovers as neighborhood zoning districts.
CONCLUSION: THE NEIGHBORHOOD AND THE SUBURB
The purpose of this paper has not been to join the chorus of BID critics,300
but rather to highlight some heretofore unappreciated virtues of the neighborhood zoning district, and to demonstrate that courts and commentators
have seriously erred in their inconsistent treatment of these two devices.
Within appropriate limits, both the neighborhood zoning district and the
BID/special assessment district can be powerful tools for helping cities
survive and prosper during a time of great interlocal competition, in which
small suburban communities have the advantage of nearly unchecked land
use authority. There is a role for the courts in delineating when a delegation
of power to the neighborhood level is appropriate, but the courts must
eschew facile distinctions between the neighborhood zoning district and the
special assessment district, and instead focus on a series of ad hoc factors
suggested by the foregoing analysis. First, does the entity exercise coercive
regulatory power, either directly or indirectly, and how far does the power
encroach upon the ability of both landowners and nonlandowners to use and
access land? Second, does the entity exercise a function or functions about
which serious intra-group disagreement is likely? Third, is the area governed by the entity sufficiently heterogeneous in terms of land uses, demographics, or other interests so as to engender disagreements among
members, and yet insufficiently heterogeneous as to permit vigorous votetrading? Fourth, is the entity a one-shot deal or does it exercise power on an
ongoing basis? Fifth, is the entity likely to generate negative externalities,
299 See DENNIS R. JUDD & TODD SWANSTROM, CITY POLITICS: PRIVATE POWER
AND PUBLIC POLICY 388-89 (4th ed. 2004) (discussing the use of “tax-increment financing”).
300 For critical assessments of the BID, see, for example, Frug, supra note 14; Garodnick,

supra note 170; and Audrey G. McFarlane, Preserving Community in the City: Special Improvement
Districts and the Privatization of Urban Racialized Space, 4 STAN. AGORA 1, 7-18 (2003) (explaining
that BIDs result in unevenness in the quality of life among neighborhoods and raise issues
regarding who should govern the BID and to what extent the franchise may be limited).
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impair comprehensive planning, or promote intralocal inequality and
balkanization? Finally, and perhaps most importantly, is the entity meaningfully constrained by a large, diverse governmental body that can counteract the threat of exploitation or other welfare-reducing actions by the
entity? The main objective of this inquiry, of course, is to ensure that there
are sufficient safeguards against abuses of power by neighborhood districts.
This last observation, however, leads to another quandary, with which
this Article concludes. I noted previously that while courts are highly
skeptical of neighborhood zoning control, they afford substantial deference
to the exercise of the zoning power by incorporated municipalities.301 Most
incorporated municipalities today, however, are small suburbs no larger
than neighborhoods.302 What can explain why courts so eagerly defer to
neighborhood-sized municipalities but not to actual neighborhoods? Is there
some reason to think that municipalities perform better than neighborhoods
on the list of ad hoc factors set forth in the previous paragraph, such that
greater deference is warranted? Quite the contrary. In fact, virtually all of
the potential checks on abuse of power listed above are absent or significantly reduced when the land use authority is exercised by incorporated
municipalities.
Consider an ironic epilogue to the Roberge trio. In the 1976 case City of
Eastlake v. Forest City Enterprises, a developer proposed to site an apartment
building in Eastlake, Ohio, a suburb of Cleveland with a population of
approximately 20,000.303 Shortly thereafter, the voters of Eastlake amended
their city charter to provide that all zoning changes must be approved by a
referendum of city voters.304 Although Eubank and Roberge drew into
question the validity of delegating the zoning power to a voter referendum,
the Supreme Court upheld the charter amendment, distinguishing Eubank
and Roberge on the grounds that the challenged ordinances in those cases
delegated power to a “narrow segment of the community, not to the people
at large.”305 The referendum at issue in Eastlake was “far more than an
expression of ambiguously founded neighborhood preference. It is the city
itself legislating through its voters—an exercise by the voters of their
traditional right . . . [to decide] what serves the public interest.”306 For

301
302
303
304
305
306

See supra note 277.
See supra note 3.
426 U.S. 668, 670 (1976); id. at 694 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
Id. at 670 (majority opinion).
Id. at 677-78.
Id. at 678 (quoting S. Alameda Spanish Speaking Org. v. City of Union City, 424 F.2d
291, 294 (9th Cir. 1970)).
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the Court, then, there was a fundamental difference between a mere
neighborhood and “the city itself.”
By almost any of the metrics we have considered so far, however, the
referendum at issue in Eastlake should be far more troubling than the
schemes in either Roberge or Eubank. The referendum provisions in Roberge
and Eubank conferred very limited powers on neighborhood groups to cast a
one-shot vote on particular land use questions, limiting the possibility of
intra-group disagreement and exploitation.307 By contrast, the Eastlake
charter amendment subjected all zoning changes in the city to a referendum
by city voters, thus increasing opportunities for exploitation. Moreover, in
Roberge and Eubank, there was, at least in principle, some opportunity for
opponents of the delegation in question to prevent the delegation by
logrolling in the city council prior to the ordinance. In Eastlake, by contrast,
there was never any opportunity for the aggrieved developer to attempt
logrolling because the zoning-referendum mechanism was itself adopted by
a one-shot voter initiative during which, of course, vote-trading would have
been impossible.
Moreover, while the record did not reflect how diverse the city of
Eastlake was, it is far more likely that a few dozen homeowners in a
homogeneously zoned neighborhood would share common views about a
proposal to site a group home in their neighborhood (Roberge) than that a
city of 20,000 would share common views about the entire range of zoning
matters that regularly come before a typical city (Eastlake). Finally, because
Eastlake’s referendum scheme was clearly intended to exclude an affordable
housing project from the city, it raises all the concerns about negative
spillovers, impairment of regional planning objectives, siting of locally
unwanted land uses, and interlocal inequality that we have canvassed
previously. In Roberge, by contrast, Seattle’s law would have enabled
neighborhood groups only to permit group homes that were otherwise
barred by a municipal zoning ordinance, not to exclude them.308 Ironically,
then, the schemes at issue in Eubank and Roberge provided far greater
procedural protections against the abuse of power than the scheme in
Eastlake. Why, then, is the Court so much more skeptical of a neighborhood
referendum than a referendum conducted by “the city itself”?309

307
308

See supra notes 68-71 & 76-78 and accompanying text.
See Washington ex rel. Seattle Title Trust Co. v. Roberge, 278 U.S. 116, 117-18 (1928)
(describing a zoning scheme under which a philanthropic home for children or the elderly would
not typically be permitted in a residential district, but prohibition could be overridden with the
consent of the owners of two thirds of the property within 400 feet of the proposed home).
309 See supra text accompanying note 306.
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Frank Michelman’s perceptive reading of Eastlake provides a possible
answer. According to Michelman, Eastlake’s apparently casual distinction
between a “neighborhood preference” and the “public interest” implicated
in a citywide referendum suggests that Eastlake rejects the entire public
choice model we have considered so far, with its depictions of sordid
logrolling and self-seeking interest groups.310 Rather, Eastlake appears to
favor a “public interest” model, in which a civic-minded public deliberates
in platonic fashion on important city affairs.311 Michelman argues that the
Eastlake Court’s distinction of Eubank and Roberge expresses, albeit somewhat crudely, the belief that the political realm is not a mere extension of
the private market, in which self-interested groups haggle for their slice of
the pie.312 Rather, there is
a strong and clear differentiation of the special role one plays as citizen from
one’s normal, everyday pursuits as private individual and, relatedly, . . . a
careful construction of special formal or ceremonial contexts designed to
place the individual in the special citizen’s role—to force that role on the
individual by cultural means—on those special occasions when political as
distinguished from normally self-regarding private action is in progress.313

According to Michelman, Eastlake should be read to mean that a neighborhood zoning referendum, in which an “immediately interested person”
participates in a “one-time blockfront decision,” does not create the necessary background conditions to awaken in the individual the “special citizen’s
motivational mode of sympathy and responsibility for all equally.”314 When,
by contrast, the referendum is placed before the entire city, “which maintains a continuing salience in [the voter’s] consciousness of political life,”315
the appropriate signal is sent to each voter that the time has come for
public-minded political action rather than “normally self-regarding private
action.”316 From this perspective, interestingly, an entity that exercises
zoning power on an ongoing basis is more legitimate than the “one-shot
310 See Michelman, supra note 61, at 182-83 (explaining that Eastlake arguably adopted a public
interest model based on the view that “there is nothing crucially objectionable about letting
decisions be made by a process such as a referendum vote offering no opportunity for votetrading, because the object of the process is supposed to be communal definition of aims”).
311 Id.
312 See id. (suggesting that the Court in Eastlake adopted Rousseau’s view that when individuals act politically, they act “on behalf of and with regard to one another, as well as themselves, as
persons worthy of a full and equal measure of respect”).
313 Id. at 184.
314 Id.
315 Id. at 185.
316 Id. at 184.
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deal” referenda involved in Eubank and Roberge—precisely the opposite of
what the public-choice analysis to this point has suggested.
Michelman’s exegesis works well as an attempt to divine the meaning
behind Eastlake’s cryptic opinion. It does not work at all—nor is it intended—
as a normative defense of local government autonomy. Eastlake’s blatantly
exclusionary referendum scheme cannot realistically be described as publicminded political action. It is instead a fairly typical instance of a suburban
municipality acting selfishly to protect its own wealth by excluding a land
use project that threatens to increase the local tax burden and lower property
values. As we have seen, this sort of self-regarding action by autonomous
incorporated municipalities has bedeviled efforts to site locally undesirable
but regionally necessary land uses, such as affordable housing. Nor can we
give much credence to the argument that Eastlake, unlike the one-shot
constructs in Eubank and Roberge, is an entity that “maintains a continuing
salience in [the voter’s] consciousness of political life.”317 Many suburbs are
themselves nothing more than constructs created in order to accomplish
particular, self-regarding goals. It is commonplace for areas to incorporate
for purely economic reasons, such as controlling their own tax base or land
use.318 Indeed, there are numerous instances of suburban areas incorporating
“defensively” for the sole purpose of defeating a proposed land use siting or
annexation, or to seize control of a revenue-generating entity.319 States have
long abandoned the notion that a group must constitute a “community” in
any meaningful sense in order to incorporate as a municipality.320
Thus, the juridical distinction between municipal–land use control and
neighborhood–land use control turns out to be just as baseless as the
distinction between special assessment districts and neighborhood zoning
districts. There is no reason, in law or public policy, to fetishize the incorporated suburb as a forum for enlightened land use decisionmaking while
deriding the neighborhood as parochial and self-regarding. To the extent
neighborhood control of zoning raises basic concerns about democratic
accountability, majoritarian exploitation, spillover impacts, intralocal
317
318

Id. at 185.
See Briffault, supra note 212, at 1141-42 (“Local boundary lines have often been drawn in
order to take advantage of the opportunity local government law provides incorporated
communities to control local land use and to escape from the fiscal burdens of the surrounding
metropolitan region.”).
319 See Schragger, supra note 212, at 1849 (providing numerous examples of “defensive”
incorporations, such as incorporating to “avoid being annexed to a less-affluent area” or to prevent
the construction of an additional airport runway).
320 See Briffault, supra note 277, at 75-76 (explaining that courts liberally sustain municipal
incorporations without regard to whether the area to be incorporated represents a “community of
interest”).
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inequality, and the like, courts can address those concerns by looking to the
ad hoc factors articulated herein, rather than through a blanket condemnation of neighborhood zoning. A close examination of those factors should
reveal, more often than not, that neighborhood control of zoning under city
supervision offers many advantages over our current system of highly
fragmented land use authority, in which incorporated municipalities have
the freedom to enact policies that serve local interests at the expense of
regional needs.

